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Abstract 
 
The Catholic Church has a unique relationship with Italy, with the location of the Vatican in 
the heart of Rome. From the time of the Italian unification in 1861, the Catholic Church has 
used different strategies to influence Italian politics. From boycotting Italian politics through 
the Non Expedit in 1874, to influencing politics through the Partito Popolare Italiano from 
1919, collaborating with the Fascist regime from the 1920s, and the very influential 
cooperation with the Democrazia Cristiana (DC) in the post-war era. Following the 
Tangentopoli and the fall of the First Republic, it was no longer possible for the Catholic 
Church to influence politics through the DC. New strategies were needed. The objective of 
this thesis is to find out which strategies the Catholic Church has used, with an emphasis on 
the period after the First Republic. My research question is as follows: 
 
“How has the Catholic Church pursued various strategies to influence Italian politics, with 
an emphasis on the period after the fall of the First republic?” 
 
To answer the research question, I have conducted qualitative document analysis. The 
theoretical framework is based on theories which comprise the influence of the Catholic 
Church, and religious organizations as a whole, on politics, religious organizations, and how 
churches can use popular referendums to affect politics. 
 
The findings indicate that the Catholic Church no longer exerts influence through one 
Christian democratic party, but that Catholic politicians are spread across all parties. In this 
way, Catholic values can be included in party politics, regardless of whether the party is on 
the Leftwing, Rightwing, or center. Catholic organizations have played an important role in 
exerting influence on Italian politics on behalf of the Catholic Church. Especially through the 
organizations Comunione e Liberazione, and the Conferenza Episcopale Italiana. When 
facing a popular referendum in 2005, the Catholic Church encouraged its adherents to abstain 
from voting. In this way, the vote did not reach the minimum requirement of 50 percent voter 
turnout, for the vote to be valid. The Pope, bishops, and clergy were active in encouraging the 
adherents of the Catholic Church. This occurred to a much higher degree than when facing 
popular referendums in the past. Some would claim that the Catholic Church has left the party 
for the pulpit, and to some degree this is true.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The Catholic Church and Italy have a long history. Since its origin, the Catholic Church has 
had its center in Italy, or what was then called the Roman Empire. This thesis will have a 
more contemporary focus. From the time of the Italian unification in 1861, the Catholic 
Church and Italian state have had to relate to each other. The Catholic Church has been 
influential on the Italian people and the Italian state. Therefore, it is interesting to see how the 
Catholic Church is working to influence Italian politics.  
 
1.1  Research Question 
 
This thesis will have an emphasis on the time after 1992, or after the fall of the First Republic. 
Following the corruption scandal known as Tangentopoli, a new electoral system was 
implemented (Killinger 2002:169-170). Several important political parties were also 
dissolved, among others the Christian democratic party, Democrazia Cristiana (DC) (Gilmour 
2011:365). Thus, it can be argued that Italian politics entered a new phase. The First Republic 
ended in 1992 (Giorgi and Polizzi 2015:135). What some would call the Second Republic 
started after that, and this is the period where this thesis will have its emphasis (Giorgi and 
Polizzi 2015:142). Some theories will claim that religion has lost its influence on society 
(Fink 2009:78). Others will claim that the Catholic Church still has much influence on Italian 
politics. However, the degree of influence will not be the focal point of this thesis. This thesis 
will focus on the strategies the Catholic Church has pursued to influence Italian politics. The 
time period will, as mentioned above, have an emphasis on the period after the fall of the First 
Republic. Although strategies before this will be discussed as well. My research question will 
be as following: 
 
How has the Catholic Church pursued various strategies to influence Italian politics, with an 
emphasis on the period after the fall of the First republic? 
 
Geographically, the research question is limited to Italy. Although the Catholic Church has 
deep roots and influence in other countries than Italy, it is still a unique case. Italy is the only 
state where a religious state exists within its own boundaries. This makes it geographically 
unique. The location of the Vatican, which is the capital of the Catholic Church, within Rome, 
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the capital of Italy, also provides a special power dynamic. The Catholic Church is, and has 
been influential in Italian politics (DiMarco 2009:2). DiMarco (2009:30) states that the 
geographical location of the Catholic Church in itself will cause it to continue being an 
influential player in Italian politics. Because of the Vatican’s location in the heart of Rome, its 
influence on Italian politics is different from its influence on other countries where 
Catholicism is the largest religion. This makes it difficult to compare different countries, and 
the case will only focus on Italy, but over a longer time span.  
 
Although the research question has an emphasis on the period after the fall of the First 
Republic, I will also look at how the Catholic Church influenced Italian politics from the time 
of unification and up until the period where the emphasis lies. This is useful to get a clearer 
view of what strategies the Catholic Church have used after the fall of the First Republic. By 
having an emphasis on the period after the First Republic, the research question will not be 
too comprehensive to answer. In addition, the emphasis on this period can contribute more to 
the field of research, as will be shown in the next section. The strategies which is used by the 
Catholic Church will be described in the theory chapter. 
 
1.2  Why is This Research Important? 
 
There are multiple reasons why this research is important. Several scholars are calling for 
more research in this field. Bolzonar (2016:448) claims that the political influence of 
Catholicism after the DC deserves more investigation as a research field. Other scholars, such 
as Fink (2009:77), claim that the influence of religion on policy-making in western societies 
is of major interest. Fink also claims that both socio-political and socio-economic issues are 
important to religious organizations. This shows that although research has been done in this 
field, there is a demand for more.  
 
Studies have been made on what strategies the Catholic Church has used in different 
scenarios. For example, when facing referendums, and how Catholic organizations are being 
used to influence politics. However, there is a lack of research which comprises all of the 
main strategies of the Catholic Church. This thesis will also show how the various strategies 
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of the Catholic Church has changed over time. The emphasis is on the strategies pursued by 
the Catholic Church after the fall of the First Republic, but the strategies pursued before this 
period will be described and discussed as well. By doing this, we can see how the strategies 
have changed over time. A research which comprises how the strategies have changed over 
time, and the discussion of all the main strategies pursued by the Catholic Church after 1992, 
will perhaps be the biggest contribution of this thesis to the field of study. 
 
1.3  The Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of six chapters including the introduction. The sixth chapter will be a 
conclusion and suggestions will be made for further research. 
 
Chapter 2 will include the theoretical framework. In this chapter, we shall see which strategies 
are identified in the literature. Theories on how the Catholic Church influences politics, 
theories on Christian democratic parties, theories on Catholic organizations and its influences 
on politics, and theories on the use of referendums, will be presented. 
 
Chapter 3 will describe the research design which is used in this thesis. It is a comparative 
historical analysis, with the use of process tracing and longitudinal comparison. Document 
analysis has been the strategy for the data collection. 
 
Chapter 4 will present a historical background for the thesis. In this chapter, I will present 
which strategies the Catholic Church used to affect Italian politics from the time of national 
unification in 1861 to the fall of the First Republic in 1992. The chapter will also describe a 
historical context, and describe the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Italian 
state during this time period. 
 
Chapter 5 consists of three parts. This is the analysis. First, I will discuss how the Catholic 
Church has been using political parties to influence Italian politics after 1992. In the second 
part, I will look at Catholic organizations and what role they are playing in influencing Italian 
politics after 1992. The third part will look at how the Catholic Church has influenced Italian 
politics through referendums after 1992. Mainly the 2005 referendum on assisted 
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reproduction. Each of the parts will be compared to the strategies of the Catholic Church prior 
to 1992. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
In this thesis, I shall not be testing one specific theory. Rather, the discussion will focus on 
why the Catholic Church changed her strategy after 1992, and what the new strategies are. 
The primary change in the value of an independent variable, was the party system. When this 
path had closed, the Catholic Church had to find new ways of influencing Italian politics. 
Here lies the focus of my thesis. 
 
Here, I will present theories on how the Catholic Church has an influence on politics, and 
theories which comprise how the Catholic Church have affected Italian politics. Some of the 
theories are specifically on the Catholic Church, some are on Christian churches in general, 
and others are on religion in general. 
 
2.1 The Catholic Church and influence on politics 
 
The Catholic Church influences politics on many levels. Religion has a way of influencing 
policy-making in many countries. Some policy-areas are generally more important to 
religious groups than others. These include socio-economic policies, such as welfare systems 
and the development of social security institutions. Others include socio-political policies. 
Abortion, education, stem-cell research, and gay-rights are some of these issues (Fink 
2009:77). There are many areas of policy which empirically show an impact from religious 
beliefs (Fink 2009:79). In the past, issues such as the legalization of divorce was also a socio-
political policy which occupied the Catholic Church in particular. One can argue that 
secularization has been on the rise in western industrialized countries during the last century. 
This has led to a debate on how large the role of religion is in social life (Fink 2009:78-79). 
Even though secularization has been on the rise, this does not mean that the shift towards 
secularism is inevitable, nor does it mean that religion has lost all its influence in society. 
How great this influence will be, depends on several factors.  
 
Fink (2009:79) claims that it will depend on the interaction between the followers, Church, 
and state. In addition, Fink claims that religion still plays a major role in the politics of 
western industrialized countries. This is based on empirical and theoretical evidence. 
Churches in western industrialized countries play an important role, although this has been 
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disputed by the secularization thesis (Fink 2009:93). The secularization thesis suggests that 
religion will begin to diminish in both the public and private arena as a society becomes more 
and more modernized (Nash 2000:1). This thesis has, however, been heavily disputed both 
empirically and theoretically (Fink 2009:78). As mentioned above, there are still many areas 
of policy where we can find empirical evidence of the influence of religious views (Fink 
2009:79). Research shows that Catholic adherents are more religious than protestants. As a 
result, they should be readier to mobilize for religious causes (Norris & Inglehart 2011). 
 
According to Nash (2000:1), there are several ways in which a church can influence 
politically. It can be directly or indirectly. Direct influence involves that the church publicly 
enters the political sphere. This may be through obtaining state positions, by hiring lobbyists, 
through legal means, or by participating institutionally in corporatist negotiating. A direct way 
of influencing occurs at the institutional level. Indirect influence will refer to the Church’s 
ability to affect individuals, and its capability to influence the laity. It is expected that the way 
a church intervenes in politics, is dependent on how it perceives its religious mission. 
Churches who see their role as moral and religious providers to individuals, are more likely to 
be indirectly influential in politics. A direct influence on politics would be exerted by 
churches which see their religious mission as moral and religious guardians to a nation or 
society (Nash 2000:2). 
 
In Italy, the Catholic Church has a great potential for mobilization. A large number of its 
followers are regularly churchgoing, and identify themselves as religious. Depending on how 
religious their adherents are, churches should vary in political behavior. The more religious 
the adherents are, the more influence the Church has on public policy. Therefore, it is easy to 
presume that the Catholic Church has a greater power to mobilize than the Protestant churches 
(Fink 2009:82). That is if, as mentioned above, Catholic adherents are more religious than 
protestant adherents. Surveys in Italy shows that 40 percent attended religious services more 
than once a week, or once a week, in 2001 (Norris & Inglehart 2011:74). Fink (2009:84) also 
claims that what determines the influence of churches, is their mobilization potential. The 
higher potential for mobilization, the more influence a church can exert. The Catholic Church 
in Italy has great mobilization potential, and has been a major player in the policy field (Fink 
2009:86). 
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There are also other factors that affect the influence of the Catholic Church on Italian politics. 
In the Italian society, the Catholic Church has served as a moral authority. It has a great 
cultural power (Fink 2009:86). The Catholic Church do not only have an influence on policy-
making through political parties, but it has an enormous influence in people’s personal lives. 
This is not unique for Italy, but underlines the influence and power of the Catholic Church. 
 
Although the Catholic Church has much influence, not everyone is satisfied with its 
involvement in politics. An Italian survey from 1972 shows that 71.8 percent of the 
respondents think the Church should stay out of politics. Interestingly, 60.6 percent of the 
Christian Democrats asked agreed on this (Marradi 1976:129). A decade earlier, La 
Palombara (1964:59) reported that there are Italians who see the involvement of the Catholic 
Church in politics as a threat. Either to their own interests, or to democratic institutions. This 
being said, others still supported the involvement of the Church in politics. 
 
As will be shown in chapter 4, the Catholic Church has influenced Italian politics for a long 
time. In 1964, at the time when the Catholic Church used the DC to influence politics, they 
were also influential in other ways. At that time, La Palombara (1964:58) claimed that 
organized Catholicism was deeply involved in Italian politics in every way. 
 
This thesis focuses on Italy, and so will this theory chapter. The Catholics in Italy are 
distinctive. Italy has unique conditions compared to the state of other nations in Europe with 
Christian cultures. Even though secularization has affected Italy as well, the majority of its 
population identify themselves as Catholics.  
 
2.2 Political Parties 
 
Christian democratic parties can be found in most European and Latin American countries. 
Some of these consist of a majority of Catholics, some of Protestants, and some of other 
denominations. Not all Christian democratic parties are very influential. While on the other 
hand, parties such as the Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union) led 
by Angela Merkel, exert a great deal of power. Given that the focal point of this thesis is Italy, 
this part will focus on the links between the Catholic Church and Christian democratic parties, 
mainly in Italy. 
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Theories claim that there are organizational links between the Catholic Church and Christian 
democratic parties in Western Europe (Norris & Inglehart 2011:22). Historically, there have 
been evidence of this in Italy as well. In Italy, this has been most evident between the 
Catholic Church and the DC. As shown in the chapter on a historical retrospective, the DC 
was a part of the Italian government for more than forty-five years. The DC was strongly 
supported by the Vatican. This shows empirically that there have been organizational links 
between the Catholic Church and a Christian democratic party in Italy. Thus, it confirms the 
theory of which Norris and Inglehart (2011:22) speaks, regarding organizational links 
between the Catholic Church and Christian democratic parties. Fink (2009:85) argues that 
strong Churches and religious parties are related phenomena. This does not, however, mean 
that the Church and Christian democratic party agree on everything. The Churches in general 
often have more extreme opinions than the parties. In Italy, some laws which were against the 
preferences of the Catholic Church, were implemented during the governance of the DC. An 
example of this is the law passed in 1970 which allowed divorce in Italy. In 1974, the law was 
submitted to a referendum. The referendum sought to repeal the law. With 50.1 percent of the 
electorate voting “no” to repeal, the referendum failed (Marradi 1976:115-117). However, this 
does not mean that the DC supported the law. The DC opposed the law before it eventually 
passed in 1970, and it campaigned against it in the 1974 referendum (Marradi 1976:115-116). 
This is one concrete example of how the Catholic Church attempted to affect Italian politics 
through a political party.  
 
Close ties between the Church and the state may constrain the political influence of the 
Church (Fink 2009:85). This may have been the case during the Fascist regime in particular. 
The Catholic Church had made a deal with Mussolini which they both benefited from. In this 
case the Church made compromises with the regime. In the case of disputes, the Catholic 
Church often emerged victorious (Duggan 2007:485-486). Despite the deal made between the 
Catholic Church and Mussolini, the Church did not hesitate to condemn the actions of the 
Fascist regime (Absalom 1995:140). Theoretically, however, close ties between the Church 
and state may reduce the political influence of the Church. 
 
In spite of this, another theory presented by Fink (2009:85) indicates that with a strong 
religious party present in politics, the political power of the churches will be enhanced. With a 
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strong religious party, this will be another access point to affect politics. Once again, if we 
look at the DC, it was another access point to politics for the Catholic Church.  
 
Christian democratic parties in general have typically tried to implement different types of 
welfare policies. This includes insurance-based benefits, and support for large families. Even 
though these are policies typically implemented by Christian democratic parties, it can also be 
found in countries where strong Christian democratic parties are absent. These empirical 
findings led to two findings, according to Bolzonar (2016:450). The first finding is that even 
in the absence of a strong political party, Catholic political ideas may have an impact. The 
second finding is that non-Christian democratic parties can take up Christian democratic 
values. Christian democratic values can be promoted through non-Christian democratic 
parties as well, and thus the Catholic Church can promote some values through non-Christian 
parties. 
 
I will end this section with a quote from Pope John Paul II. Despite the theories claiming there 
are organizational links between the Catholic Church and Christian democratic parties in 
Western Europe (Norris & Inglehart 2011:22), Pope John Paul II had a different opinion of 
how the relationship between the Catholic Church and political parties should be. Note that 
this was directed to the Polish episcopate. Weigel (1994:41) writes that when addressing the 
Polish bishops, John Paul II said:  
 
“the Church is not a political party nor is she identified with any political party; she is 
above them, open to all people of good will, and no political party can claim the right 




Much more numerous than political parties, Catholic organizations can be found all over 
Italy. Both on the national-, regional-, and local level. These organizations vary in size, 
purpose, and influence. Naturally, Catholic organizations do not have a direct involvement in 
politics in the same way as Catholic parties do. This does not, however, mean that they are not 
involved in politics altogether. Catholic parties influence through governance, policy-making, 
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and presence in the legislature, and the judicial and executive branches. Catholic 
organizations and interest groups on the other hand, have other ways of affecting politics. 
 
Interest groups may also support political parties. This support can come in different forms. 
Some will endorse the party as a whole, or individual candidates. They may offer support 
during elections and campaigns. For example, by financial aid, supplying campaign workers, 
offer facilities for rallies and meetings, offer logistical support, or contribute with organizers. 
The Catholic Church in Italy functioned in this way as an interest group focusing on helping 
Catholic parties in Italy, which again would benefit the Catholic Church (Warner 2000:98). 
 
The Catholic Church in itself is a religious organization. However, the section on 
organizations will have its focal point on how the Catholic Church uses other organizations as 
a way to influence Italian politics. Another brief historical retrospective will show that in the 
19th century, the Roman Catholic Church itself was a major contributor to the emergence of 
civil society at the international level. Today, religious international nongovernmental 
organizations are one of the largest groups of lobbyists at the United Nations. Their work in 
both addressing and solving international problems has been more and more recognized since 
the 1980s (Beckford 2015:411). This group of religious international nongovernmental 
organizations does not only include Catholic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), but the 
Catholic NGOs are a part of it. In other words, Catholic NGOs also represent a large group of 
lobbyist. There is no reason to believe that lobbying activities only occur at an international 
level. It also occurs on the national level in Italy. Knill and Preidel (2015:383) claims that the 
Catholic Church in Italy is active in lobbying. This, they claim, is made easier by the close 




Before presenting theories, and later on discussing, popular referendums, it is necessary to 
define what a popular referendum is. Le Bihan (2016:1) refers to referendums as a “direct 
vote of the general electorate on a single political question”. I argue that this is a suitable 
definition. Each country has different criterions of how one can submit a law to a referendum, 
but this definition is suitable for how a referendum works. In Italy, 500 000 signatures must 
be collected before a law can be submitted to a referendum. In addition, in Italy a referendum 
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cannot be submitted on laws that encompasses certain issues. These include for example 
regulation on the budget and taxes (Le Bihan 2016:4). 
 
According to Fink (2009:84), referendums are the most important veto points which churches 
can use. Veto points has the role of facilitating political action from churches. Referendums 
can be used in several ways. As shown by the example in Italy from the 1974 referendum on 
divorce, referendums can be used to overturn, or try to overturn, already implemented laws. It 
does not always come to this. It is not only the push for a referendum that can affect laws. 
Even a threat to promote a referendum can be useful for churches. By threatening with a 
referendum in the case of an implementation of a law, the churches can affect policy-making. 
In this way, the strategy can be used even before a law has passed, or a referendum has been 
issued. If, say the Catholic Church, threatens with a referendum, the legislators must calculate 
how large the risk is of the law being overturned later. After calculating the risk, the 
legislators must design the law proposal accordingly. This strategy can be used not only by 
churches, but other interest groups as well (Immergut 1992:31). Fink (2009:84), claims that it 
is obvious how important referendums are for churches. With the mobilization potential of 
churches, they can threaten to use this in a referendum. This threat can lead to negotiations 
with political actors. If the negotiations do not lead to anything, or the law has already been 
passed, churches can use referendums to overturn existing laws. 
 
Popular referendums are viewed by political parties as unexpected and as a largely unwanted 
phenomenon. At first, political parties thought they could control the outcomes of 
referendums, and on which laws that were subjected to a referendum. Catholic groups, among 
others, were the first of non-political parties to promote referendums. This caught the political 
parties by surprise (Uleri 2002:868).  
 
The use of referendums does not always benefit the churches. Whether or not to use a 
referendum, or threaten to use a referendum, is something each church must evaluate. If the 
mobilization potential of the church is low, a referendum could work against its purpose. 
Churches with low mobilization power, should try to avoid the usage of referendums. Even 
the Catholic Church do no longer fight to restrict the law on abortion, as shown in the 
historical retrospective chapter, but choose battles they are more likely to win (DiMarco 
2009:13). The Catholic Church in Italy, however, has a high mobilization potential. It is 
therefore more likely that they will succeed in using referendums, or threaten to use 
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referendums. As Fink (2009:77) claims, the Catholic Church is a stronger veto player than 
protestant churches. Whether or not the Catholic Church in Italy is more likely to succeed in 
using referendums, however, will not be discussed further in depth here. 
 
Referendums increases the potential of churches to act politically (Fink 2009:84). Even 
though the Catholic Church used the DC to mobilize voters against the 1974 referendum, a 
church is not dependent of a political party to repeal laws through referendums. 
 
There are empirical observations which show that mobilization potential is strongly 
dependent on issues. In some cases, a church may lose the votes of their adherents, while in 
others they may attract the votes of non-adherents (Fink 2009:82). Further empirical evidence, 
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Chapter 3: Method 
 
The research method of this thesis will use a case study. Traditionally the qualitative method 
is oriented toward cases (Ragin 1987:3). Neuman (2011:165) claims that qualitative research 
speaks a language of cultural meaning, cases and contexts. The emphasis of qualitative 
research, Neuman claims, is to examine specific cases which occur in the social life. 
Therefore, using a qualitative research design will be most suitable for my thesis. 
 
3.1 Case study 
 
It can be difficult to give a precise definition of case study. Gerring (2004:341-342) lists 
several meanings to the term case study. These includes that the research is conducted “in the 
field”, that the method is qualitative, the research will be described by process-tracing, the 
properties of a single case is investigated during the research, or that the research revolves 
around a single example or phenomenon. The first four definitions are problematized, and 
Gerring concludes that a case study centers on an example, phenomenon or instance. 
Although this is also an ambiguous meaning. A new definition is proposed as a substitute for 
these others. Gerring (2004:342) defines the case study as: “an intensive study of a single unit 
for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units”.  This is a minimal 
definition. The definition proposed by Gerring does not focus much on a specific method or 
research design, but more on generalization. I will use the definition presented by Creswell 
(2013:97): 
 
“Case study research is a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a 
real-life, contemporary bound system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) 
over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of 
information (e.g., observations, interviews, audiovisual material, and documents and 
reports), and reports a case description and case themes. The unit of analysis in the 
case study might be multiple cases (a multisite study) or a single case (a within-site 
study)”. 
 
The definition presented by Gerring is, as mentioned above, focused on how we study a single 
unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of units. Its focus lies on generalization. 
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Although one can argue that the results of my thesis can be used to understand other cases, it 
is still in many ways a unique case. Catholicism plays a meaningful part in the life of many 
Italian citizens. This is not unique for Italy. There are many countries where Catholicism is an 
important part of people’s lives. Italy is unique because of the geographical location of the 
Vatican City. The geographical center of the Catholic Church is within the borders of the 
Italian state. Because of the location of the Vatican state, this case cannot automatically be 
applied to other Catholic countries. This makes the Italian case unique. More on whether or 
not the findings in this thesis can be generalized will be mentioned under 3.6. 
 
3.2 Case and case selection 
 
The case country in this thesis is Italy. Italy was selected as the case country before I found 
theories on this case. When looking at the influence of the Catholic Church on state politics, 
there has historically never been a country which was more influenced by the Vatican State. 
As I mentioned more thoroughly in the brief historical retrospective, the Vatican has 
exercised a great deal of influence on Italian politics and the Italian state. Even if we limit the 
timeline from the unification of Italy in 1861 to today’s date. Italy is not the only country 
where the Catholic faith is an important part of people’s lives, nor is it the only country where 
the Catholic Church can influence politics. In many countries, Catholicism is the dominant 
religion. For example, in Brazil, Poland, and Spain, 65 percent or more of its population are 
Catholics (Nash 2000:1). But aforementioned, Italy is a unique case because of its historical 
close ties with the Vatican City, and the location of the Vatican state. 
 
When selecting a case, we need to be aware of potential selection bias. George and Bennett 
(2005:22) claims that case study methods are often criticized for selection bias. Even though 
selection bias can be a threat in case study research, it can pose a much larger problem in 
statistical research. However, this does not mean that we should not devote attention to the 
issue. In this thesis, I will also address the issue of selection bias. According to George and 
Bennett (2005:83), when selecting a case, the highest priority is that the case should be 
relevant to the objective of the research. This applies whether the research objective of the 
study includes theory development, or theory testing. In this research, the case has been 
selected in advance. This is one of the arguments for why selection bias is not a problem in 
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this thesis. Another argument is the uniqueness of the case. A similar case would be difficult, 
if at all possible, to find. Italy is unique in this aspect. 
 
This thesis studies the relationship between religion and politics in a specific country. A 
similar study could be conducted by researching a similar relationship in a different country 
as well. I will, however, argue that this is a unique case. 
 
3.3 The Comparative Method 
 
In comparative social science, the comparative method has been viewed as the main method. 
Comparison is valuable because it allows us to evaluate and interpret cases with theories. It 
also makes it possible for us to make statements about empirical regularities. Comparison is 
very common in social research. Empirical social research will in almost every case involve 
comparison. Cases are compared to each other, but they are also compared to theoretically 
derived pure cases. For empirical social science, comparison is essential (Ragin 1987:1). The 
comparative method focuses on comparing cases and examining cases. It is essentially a case-
oriented strategy of comparative research. The comparative method is qualitatively different 
from the statistical method. In many ways, it is advantageous because it is suited for questions 
which is common for comparatists to ask (Ragin 1987:16). 
 
Ragin (1987:3-4) states that a common definition of comparative research is a: “research that 
uses comparable data from at least two societies”. However, many researchers within the field 
would argue that this definition is too restrictive. This is partly because the definition states 
that data of comparative social science are cross-societal. Ragin (1987:4) points out that the 
aforementioned definition would exclude comparative case studies such as Democracy in 
America by Alexis de Tocqueville. My thesis does not use comparable data from two 
societies as well, but compares the same society over time. Thus, the research is comparative, 
but instead of focusing on different societies in one specific period of time, the focus lies on 
the same society over time.  
 
Mill’s indirect method of difference, is what Ragin (1987:39) calls “a double application of 
the method of agreement”. The method of agreement argues that if a phenomenon is being 
investigated, and two or more instances of that phenomenon have only one of several possible 
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causal circumstances in common, then the circumstance in which all the instances agree is 
what cause the phenomenon (Ragin 1987:36). While the method of agreement views the 
causal circumstance in which all the instances agree upon as the cause of the phenomenon, the 
indirect method of difference views the causal circumstance which is different as the cause of 
the phenomenon. The indirect method of difference, as well as the method of difference, is an 
empirical method (Ragin 1987:39). After the First Republic, the causal circumstance that 
differed from the post-war era is the party system. As we shall see in chapter 5, the Catholic 
Church could no longer influence Italian politics through a large Christian democratic party as 
it had done during the post-war era, due to a change in the party system. 
 
In this case study, the focus lies on one single case. One country is being observed and 
examined over a period of time. The main emphasis in this thesis, is from 1992 to the present 
day. In addition, the time period from the formation of the Italian state, and to the fall of the 
First Republic in 1992, will be observed and discussed. The longitudinal comparison research 
design is common in observational studies. According to Gerring and McDermott (2007:694), 
longitudinal comparison is in use where a researcher concentrates on a single case and the 
theoretical variable of interest in that case goes through a change. Neuman (2011:44) defines 
longitudinal research as “Any research that examines information from many units or cases 
across more than one point in time”. Further on, Neuman (2011:44) states that longitudinal 
studies can be used for explanatory, exploratory, and descriptive purposes. In this research, it 
will be used for exploratory purposes. 
 
3.4 Process Tracing 
 
When conducting a qualitative analysis, process tracing is an essential tool. According to 
George and Bennett (2005:6), process tracing “attempts to trace the links between possible 
causes and observed outcomes”. When a theory hypothesizes a causal process in a case, 
process-tracing is used to see if this is apparent in the variables in that case. This is done 
through examining documents, histories, and other sources (George and Bennett 2005:6). 
Collier (2011:823) defines process tracing as:  
 
“the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of 
research questions and hypothesis posed by the investigator”.  
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Further on, he explains how process tracing can contribute to evaluate causal claims, as well 
as describing both social and political phenomena. Process training can contribute to research 
objectives such as identifying new phenomena, both political and social. It can contribute to 
the discovery of new hypotheses, evaluate prior explanatory hypotheses, gain insight to causal 
mechanisms, and address selection bias, spuriousness and reciprocal causation (Collier 
2011:824). Process tracing is also a tool of causal inference. The tool focus on how events or 
situations unfold over time. However, to do this, one must be able to describe an event at one 
point in time. Instead of starting with observations of change, process tracing has to begin 
with making good observations of specific moments. This is essential for characterizing a 
process. First, we must characterize important steps in the process, and only then can we 
make a good analysis of the sequence and change (Collier 2011:824). 
 
In the fourth chapter of this thesis I write about the relationship between the Catholic Church 
and the Italian State in a historical perspective. The chapter comprises the historical 
relationship from 1861 to the end of the First Republic. Although the emphasis of my research 
objective is to look at what strategies the Catholic Church has used to influence Italian 
politics after 1992, I also discuss the strategies used before this. As mentioned above, process 
tracing focus on how events or situations unfold over time. For this to be possible, one needs 
to be able to describe an event at one point in time. My observations have been of several 
points throughout the history of Italy since its process of unification in the 1860s. This makes 
it possible for me to make a good analysis of the various strategies the Catholic Church has 
pursued to influence Italian politics in the period before the Second Republic, and the time 
after which is where the emphasis of this thesis lies. 
 
3.5 Data Collection 
 
The data collected for this thesis is mainly done through qualitative document analysis. 
Documents analyzed are collected from different sources. This entails books on the history of 
Italy, research which is published from other scholars, encyclicals from the Vatican, speeches 
from different Popes, and documents on election results. Previously published research will 
include both research on the subject being researched, but also other subjects which will help 
enlighten the subject of my research. 
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Qualitative document analysis involves a systematic review of documents with an aim to 
register relevant data, and categorize its content. Selection of documents is partly done during 
collection of the data. Collecting the data also happens simultaneous with analyzing the data. 
While the researcher analyzes the collected documents, he/she gains a greater understanding 
of what type of texts are relevant for the analysis. The researcher also becomes more capable 
of answering the research question (Grønmo 2004:187).  
 
There are some problems the researcher must be conscious of when conducting a qualitative 
document analysis. One of them is that the perspective of the researcher can affect the 
selection and interpretation of the documents. Some documents can be left out because the 
content does not fit in with the perspective of the researcher. This in turn can affect the 
findings and results of the research (Grønmo 2004:188-192). Problems related to the 
perspective of the researcher can be dealt with. Throughout my research I have tried to take in 
every interesting perspective. If a text is relevant or can contribute to a new perspective, I 
have tried to use it in my research. Grønmo (2004:192) claims that problems related to the 
perspective of the researcher can be prevented by viewing the relevance of the text from 
different perspectives, and not only texts that are typical for the categories in the research. 
Texts that are deviant from these categories can also be of importance for the research, and 
including this can prevent the perspective of the researcher to be a problem. 
 
Another potential problem when conducting a qualitative document analysis is to be careless 
when considering sources. All sources must be viewed with a critical and contextual 
consideration (Grønmo 2004:188). When conducting a research, there are many available 
sources which we can use. The selection of specific sources must therefore be thoroughly 
considered. It is important to be critical of the sources we have. Grønmo (2004:121-123) 
names four criteria in which all sources should be critically judged. These are availability, 
relevance, authenticity, and credibility. 
 
In my thesis, I have found numerous sources that are available. These are mainly collected 
from books, scientific journals and other scientific publications. A problem which may occur 
with availability is that sources which may be important are not available. If documents are 
not available, then this could make it difficult to answer the research question (Grønmo 
2004:122). Translated into my thesis, I believe some hypothetical documents that I do not 
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have could come be useful. For example, if the Vatican City had a formal strategy on how to 
affect politics in Italy. Both prior to 1992, and past. I wrote “hypothetical” because it is hard 
to say if such documents exist. If such documents do exist, I do not have access to them. In 
my case, the lack of official Vatican documents does not prevent me from answering the 
research question. Some Vatican documents, encyclicals, and speeches from different Popes, 
are however available, and have been useful in this thesis. Other documents have also been 
very useful. Publications in the Journal of Modern Italian Studies in particular. The Oxford 
Handbook of Italian Politics is one of several books that have also been useful. As well as 
other publications. Another problem with availability in my thesis is the possibility of 
potentially useful articles which have been overlooked because they are written in Italian. In 
spite of this potential problem, there are many publications in the field of research which are 
written in, or translated into, English. I therefore do not consider lack of availability to be an 
issue. 
 
When selecting sources, it is important to choose the sources that are most relevant (Grønmo 
2004:122). Of the available sources, I have only included the ones that are relevant in my 
thesis. Not all data which is collected and reviewed will be relevant for my thesis. In such 
cases, I will exclude the irrelevant data. 
 
Judging whether or not the sources are authentic is an important aspect when selecting 
sources. This is especially important when conducting qualitative interviews, or when 
reviewing old documents (Grønmo 2004:122-123). Neither of these take place in my thesis. 
Even though neither of these take place in my thesis, I have been aware of considering the 
authenticity of the sources I have used. Articles are collected through acknowledged scientific 
journals, and books are published by credible publishers, such as Oxford University Press 
(Hopkin 2015), Routledge (Fink 2009), and Penguin Group (Duggan 2007), to name a few. 
Documents from the official website of the Holy See has been used as well. One source from 
the Boston Globe (Allen 2014) is used for a discussion in the analysis chapter. This is 
included due to an interesting view offered by a political commentator. I have underlined that 
this view is an opinion, and not an undisputed fact. 
 
Even though the sources are authentic, they need to have credibility. In this lies the question if 
we can have confidence in the information we receive. Documents could, for example, 
contain misleading information because the scholar wishes to promote specific interests. It is 
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important to consider if the documents are affected by issues of credibility (Grønmo 
2004:123). In my thesis, I do not believe that this is an issue. It is hard to see what the authors 
and scholars of the books and papers I have used, should gain from distorting facts, or 
promoting one view over another. The literature I have used also covers different 
perspectives. Some sources may be critical of how much influence the Catholic Church has in 
Italian politics, while others are under the impression that the Catholic Church has less power 
now than earlier. Regardless of what one would think of this question, it is possible to give a 
good answer to how the Catholic Church has pursued different strategies to affect Italian 
politics, with an emphasis on the period after the fall of the First Republic. 
 
3.6 Validity and Reliability 
In all research, it is important that the research design is of high quality. To judge the quality 
of the research design, we can conduct tests regarding validity and reliability. According to 
Yin (2003:33-39), there are four tests which are common to establish the quality of empirical 
social research. This includes usage in case studies. These four tests are: construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity, and reliability. 
 
Construct validity. Gerring (2012:95-96) claims that construct validity refers to how faithful a 
research design is to the theory that is being investigated. It is underlined that researchers 
must work hard to make certain that empirical tests are bound in theory. To gain a higher 
degree of construct validity it is important to develop an operational set of measures for what 
is researched. Lack of operational measures has led to criticism of case studies, because critics 
claim that the researcher could collect data through subjective judgements (Yin 2003:35). 
There are, however, measures to increase construct validity. Yin (2003:36) lists three main 
tactics. The first is multiple sources of evidence during data collection. During my data 
collection, I have mainly relied on documents. The documents do, however, derive from 
different sources. Both Italian and sources from other parts of the world. This increases the 
construct validity. Secondly, during the data collection, the researcher must establish a chain 
of evidence. The third is to have key informants review the draft case study report. 
 
Internal validity. Yin (2003:36) addresses two issues regarding internal validity. The first is a 
concern for causal case studies. Causal case studies are case studies in which an investigator 
tries to determine if one specific event led to another specific event. Tests for internal validity 
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are made to make sure the researcher does not conclude that one specific event led to another 
specific event, without taking into account that a spurious effect may have occurred. The 
second issue is the problem of making inferences. A case study has to deal with inference 
when an event cannot be observed. When this happens, the researcher will make an inference 
that a particular event resulted from something that occurred earlier. This inference is based 
on documented evidence or interviews which are collected as part of the case study. To deal 
with this issue the researcher must anticipate questions regarding how correct the inference is. 
By anticipating this in the research design, it is easier to deal with the issue of internal validity 
(Yin 2003:36). It can be difficult to achieve internal validity. Yin (2003:36) describes four 
ways of addressing internal validity. These are pattern matching, explanation building, 
addressing rival explanations, and using logic models. All occur during the data analysis (Yin 
2003:34). By looking at different sources, and viewing several aspects, I attempt to achieve 
internal validity. When researching which strategies have been used by the Catholic Church to 
influence Italian politics, with an emphasis on the period after the fall of the First Republic, I 
do not only look at one specific strategy, but take into account different strategies. These are 
also compared to strategies used in the past. 
 
External validity. The test regarding external validity deals with the problem of whether or 
not the findings in a study is generalizable beyond the case study (Yin 2003:37). In my case, 
it regards whether or not my findings on which strategies the Catholic Church has used to 
influence Italian politics, with an emphasis on the period after the fall of the First Republic, 
can be applied to other countries where the Catholic Church has major influence. There has 
been a common critic that single cases are not good for generalizing. However, where survey 
research focus on statistical generalization, case studies rely on analytical generalization. The 
researcher will try to generalize a particular set of results to a broader theory in analytical 
generalization (Yin 2003:37). In my thesis, a problem with external validity occurs. Italy is a 
unique case, and the empirical results found in this thesis is only valid in Italy. However, it is 
possible that the various strategies which the Catholic Church has pursued to influence Italian 
politics may be generalized to other countries with a Catholic majority. However, Italy is a 
unique country in how the Catholic Church influences politics. As stated earlier, this has to do 
with the location of the Vatican City. The geographical center of the Catholic Church which is 
located within the borders of Italy. This context separates Italy from other Catholic countries. 
It is, as mentioned earlier, a unique case. 
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Reliability. The objective of this test is to be sure that if another researcher would follow the 
same procedures as described by the researcher who originally conducted the study, and 
conduct the same study all over again, then the last researcher would make the same findings 
and conclusions. In order to allow other researchers to repeat an earlier study, the procedures 
from the earlier case must be documented. Reliability has a goal of minimizing errors and 
biases in a study (Yin 2003:37-38). It is difficult to exclude bias and errors altogether. In this 
thesis, I have tried to limit the possibilities of this occurring by citing all my sources. By 
doing this, I believe this thesis do have a large degree of reliability. Bias may have occurred 
because I have relied on books and research written in English and Norwegian. In the section 
on construct validity, I stated that I have used sources from Italy and other parts of the world. 
Documents that were originally written in Italian have been translated, but there have also 
been documents written in Italian that I have not used due to a language barrier. Because of 
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Chapter 4: A Brief Historical Retrospective 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, this master’s thesis will focus on which strategies the 
Catholic Church have been using to affect Italian politics, with an emphasis on the period 
after 1992. Before I go on with this task, a brief historical retrospective is useful to see which 
strategies the Catholic Church used to affect Italian politics prior to 1992. A historical 
retrospective will also clarify why I’ve chosen to emphasize the period after 1992. This 
chapter will encompass the strategies used by the Catholic Church between the unification in 
1861 and the fall of the First Republic in 1992. Some historical context will also be provided. 
The most essential periods are: the time of unification, the founding of the first political party 
with affiliation to the Catholic Church, Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI), fascism and the 
Lateran Treaty, the post-war era, and the corruption scandal called Tangentopoli. In addition, 
two important referendums will also be included. This is the referendum on divorce in 1974, 
and the referendum on restricting abortion in 1981. The chapter is concluded with a short 
summary.  
 
4.1  Unification of Italy to the PPI (1861-1922) 
 
The Italian state and the Catholic Church had immediate tensions at the time of the unification 
of Italy. The unification of Italy implied the invasion of the Papal States. Given the different 
Papal States within the borders of what would be a unified Italy, it would not be possible to 
complete a unification without this invasion. Even though both San Marino and the Vatican 
City State are still independent states within the Italian borders, the Papal States combined 
covered a much larger area, than these. In addition, they had a larger military power compared 
to San Marino and the Vatican City State, even though the military power of the Papal States 
was not great. The founders of the Italian state may have tried to justify such an invasion. An 
invasion of the Papal States in the name of unification was however not a legitimate reason. 
In fact, when the Piedmontese army invaded the Papal states it was in violation of 
international law (Duggan 2007:210). During a debate in the Chamber of Deputies in March 
1861, it was debated if Rome should be declared the new capital. At this point the Papal 
States Marche and Umbria had already been annexed and only Lazio remained. If the Italian 
state was also going to take Rome, that would mean the end of the Papal States. The Count of 
Cavour, Camillo Benso (called Cavour), who now would be inaugurated as Prime Minister, 
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was an advocate for making Rome the capital. In return for Rome, Cavour said that the 
kingdom would guarantee the Church in its spiritual mission. It would be a free Church in a 
free state. However, Pope Pius IX (1846-78) would not accept such a solution (Duggan 
2007:243). 
 
It was not until September 1870 that Rome was occupied by Italian forces. French troops had 
until then defended the pope, but as they withdrew to fight battles against Prussia, Italian 
forces moved in. From 1861-65 the capital had Turin, before being temporarily moved to 
Florence from 1865-70. In 1870, it was moved to Rome. As early as 1874 the Vatican had 
decreed the encyclical Non Expedit, which prohibited Catholics from participating in Italian 
national politics. By the time that Rome was occupied by Italian forces, priests were 
condemning the Italian government from their pulpits. This put pressure on the Italian 
government. In 1871, the Law of Papal Guarantees was issued. The law would separate the 
Church and State, and ensure protection of the Church. It would also expand the Pope’s 
privileges equivalent to a head of state. Pope Pius IX argued that the legislation could be 
revoked at any time, and thus scorned the offer. Pius IX declared himself a “prisoner of the 
Vatican” (Killinger 2002:118). This claim was not only rhetorical. Pope Pius IX was often the 
target of insults on the streets (Doumanis 2001:110). The Law of Papal Guarantees remained 
nonetheless. The protection and privileges granted to it was generally accepted by the 
Vatican, while the government did not move to amend it. Italian Catholics did, despite the 
Non Expedit, participate in national politics, but relations between the Vatican and the Italian 
government remained strained (Killinger 2002:118-119). Pope Pius IX would continue to 
denounce the Italian state and remained unfriendly to it (Doumanis 2001:111).  
 
In the 1890s Catholics formed Christian cooperatives, agricultural unions, and democratic 
organizations. This happened under Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903). The church leaders had at 
this time recognized that their opposition to the Italian state had failed (Killinger 2002:129). 
During the election of 1904, Giovanni Giolitti reached out to Catholic voters. The election of 
1904 marked a re-entry of Catholics into active politics. Pope Pius X (1903-14), a political 
moderate, approved, if not urged, this (Killinger 2002:128). 
 
The Non Expedit formally applied until 1919. In 1919, the Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) 
contested its first election, with the Vatican’s approval (Doumanis 2001:111-112). The PPI 
was organized by the Sicilian priest Don Luigi Sturzo, and won 100 seats of 508 in the 1919 
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elections (Killinger 2002:140). During the 1921 elections, the PPI increased its representation 
to 107 seats of 535 (Killinger 2002:142). When the PPI was founded in 1919, the Non 
Expedit ended. As mentioned above, there were many Catholics who voted and were even 
active in politics. This does not mean that the Non Expedit did not have an effect, but it shows 
that not everyone respected it. When it ended in 1919, this meant that the Catholics who had 
been following the encyclical of the late Pope Pius IX were now allowed to participate in 
politics. The immediate support that the PPI enjoyed shows that many Catholics were eager to 
participate in politics. They were at least eager to use their right to vote. The PPI was the only 
party that enjoyed the Vatican’s approval. By gaining the Vatican’s approval, it can be 
expected that the Vatican in return had a deep influence on the party. 
 
4.2  Mussolini (1922-43) 
 
In 1922 the Fascist movement, led by Benito Mussolini, seized power in Italy (Tintori and 
Colucci 2015:39). Mussolini enjoyed support from people who had a high status in the 
Church (Absalom 1995:128). Also, Mussolini managed to cooperate with the Catholic 
Church. In 1922, Mussolini received the vote of confidence from the leaders of the Catholic 
Church (Killinger 2002:143). During negotiations with the Vatican in 1923, Mussolini offered 
favors if the Church would abandon the PPI and its leader. These favors included, among 
other things, a guaranteed Catholic presence in the schools (Killinger 2002:145). 
 
As early as 1926, Pope Pius XI (1922-39) was involved in secret negotiations for a concordat 
(Duggan 2007:484). The Lateran Treaty of 1929 reached an agreement between Mussolini 
and the Vatican. This normalized the Fascist regime in the eyes of many Catholics, both in 
Italy and around the world. The Catholic Church gained autonomy for the Vatican state, 
freedom for Catholic organizations, and protection of Catholic schools. Mussolini, on the 
other hand, received support for his government, the legitimizing stamp of the Church for the 
regime, and he also managed to reverse the Church’s long boycott of Italian politics (Killinger 
2002:151). The relationship between them was beneficial for both sides (DiMarco 2009:4). 
Among the most important things the Church gained was autonomy of the Catholic 
organization of laymen, called Catholic Action, or Azione Cattolica (Absalom 1995:140). 
More on Catholic Action will be written in the next section. The Pope also received a 
compensation of 750 million lire, plus 1000 million in bonds for the loss of Church property 
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since 1860. Catholicism was also declared the official religion of the state (Duggan 2007:484-
485). The boycott of Italian politics from the Catholic Church had then lasted for almost sixty 
years (Killinger 2002:12). Until the Italian nation-state gained Papal recognition, the 
relationship between the nation-state and the Vatican ranged from estranged to hostile 
(Doumanis 2001:110). Following the Lateran Treaty, the relationship was not perfect, given 
the many differences in opinions between the Catholic Church and the Fascist regime, but it 
was better than it had been for a long time. The pacts were applauded internationally as 
diplomatic triumphs, and both the Church and Mussolini benefited from them (Duggan 
2007:485). 
 
Pope Pius XI did, however, react strongly against Fascist and Nazi attempts to invade the area 
of spiritual authority. This was an important area, which was naturally claimed by the Church. 
Pius XI attacked what he called Fascist ‘paganism’, after Mussolini closed Catholic Action’s 
youth and university branches. This attack was launched in an encyclical in 1929 which 
gained the support of many faithful believers all around Catholic Europe (Absalom 
1995:140). Even though much criticism has been directed to how the Catholic Church 
responded to Mussolini and fascism, the Vatican did also condemn the actions of the Fascist 
regime. When Mussolini imposed racial laws, Pope Pius XI denounced them as cruel and un-
Christian. Despite this, the Papacy never constituted a threat which might overthrow the 
regime. The Papacy were however a constant reminder of how the totalitarian state was 
incomplete (Absalom 1995:140). Mussolini knew that the independence of Catholic Action 
prevented his dream of a totalitarian state. Therefore, he attacked Catholic youth 
organizations. When Mussolini and the Vatican reached a peace agreement, the Church 
emerged as the victor. The Church was allowed to continue, but only with religious activities. 
Nonetheless the Vatican kept expanding among the civil society, and especially with youth 
groups (Duggan 2007:485-486). 
 
During the Mussolini era, the Catholic Church was directly active within politics for the first 
time after the unification of Italy. The PPI was affected by the Vatican, and could further on 
affect the people, while during the Mussolini era, the Vatican communicated directly with the 
Fascist regime. As mentioned in chapter 2, Nash (2000:1) writes that a Church can exert 
direct influence through participating institutionally in corporatist negotiations. How the 
Catholic Church bargained with Mussolini and the Fascist regime, is an example of how it 
exerted direct influence. Through institutional participation in corporatist negotiations, the 
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Catholic Church came to agreements with the Fascist regime. The Lateran Treaty was a result 
of this. After the fall of Mussolini and the Fascist regime, the Church was in need of new 
ways to influence Italian politics. 
 
4.3  Post-War Era (1946-92) 
 
The post-war era opened the doors for new strategies for the Catholic Church. Before the 
Mussolini era, the Church had not participated in politics. It was limited how much the 
Catholic Church managed to affect the authoritarian state during the Mussolini era. 
 
After the second world war, the Catholic Church placed limits on the Left’s ability to make 
changes. In addition to the Catholic Church, economic influence from America, and support 
from the USA and Great Britain also contributed in limiting the Left’s ability to make 
changes. One of the ways the Catholic Church did this was through the Christian democratic 
party, Democrazia Cristiana (DC). Headed by among others the future Italian Prime Minister, 
Alcide De Gasperi, the DC was founded during the second world war (Clark 1996:294). The 
DC was supported by the Vatican, and grounded in a number of Catholic organizations. In 
this way, the DC could place limits on the Left. In fact, the DC’s strongest appeal was its 
opposition to communism (Killinger 2002:159-160). Although the DC won a decisive victory 
in the 1948 elections, it did not manage to repeat this. The DC also struggled with internal 
conflicts. It struggled to maintain internal unity. In the 1953 general elections, the DC lost 
seats to the extreme Right and Left. During the 1950s, the DC looked to broaden the coalition 
in an attempt to bring in stability. They looked to the Left to bring in the Italian Socialist 
Party, Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI). The Vatican and the United States opposed this, 
making the Apartura ala sinistra (opening to the Left) difficult. However, during the 1960s 
the DC was able to open to the Left after all. This was partly due to a new papacy (John 
XXIII) (1958-63) who embraced liberal democracy and progressive social thought, and a new 
U.S. presidency (John F. Kennedy) who used his influence to soften the relationship with the 
Left (Killinger 2002:164-165). 
 
After 1945, the organization Catholic Action took control over ex-Fascist youth 
organizations, welfare bodies and the Dopolavoro (an ex-Fascist leisure organization for 
adults). Among the things they inherited were thousands of charities, such as orphanages. 
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Many of these were already run by the Church. The amount of national welfare agencies the 
DC took over, and founded, within the twenty years after 1948, combined to a total of 193 
(Clark 1996:335). Catholic Action was very influential until the Second Vatican Council 
(1962-65). In 1960, it had more than three million members, and played a major role in 
educating lay Catholics (Garelli 2007:27). As we shall see in the next paragraph, Catholic 
Action also fostered politicians. Some of whom would form the DC. 
 
The DC was one of the most dominant parties in the post-war era. When it was founded, it 
was hardly a party at all. The DC was only a coalition of laymen from Catholic Action. Some 
came from the PPI as well. Others from Catholic co-operatives and Catholic unions from the 
pre-fascist era. Alcide De Gasperi became the leader of the DC. De Gasperi tried to win great 
autonomy from the Church. Its voters were predominantly religious, in that the majority of 
them regularly attended mass. Anti-Communism, religion, and the family, was among the 
most important appeals for the DC. Women represented a majority of its votes, but also 
inhabitants of small towns, elders, and small landowners, especially in parts of Northern Italy. 
The DC also supported small enterprises, co-operatives and peasant landownership. Though it 
was ill-disciplined and complex, the DC enjoyed great support. It was an inter-class party, and 
at most times a populist-, and sometimes progressive party. The DC ruled permanently from 
1946. Between 1948 and 1979 the DC won between 38.3 and 48.4 percent of the votes in the 
Chamber of Deputies (Clark 1996:327-329). The DC was so influential and in possession of 
so much power that some would argue that the most important post in Italy at this time was 
neither Prime Minister, nor President, but secretary of the DC (Clark 1996:333). When the 
most dominant party in Italy had its roots in the Catholic Church, it is clear that the Vatican 
could influence politics through a political party. The Catholic Church gained much political 
strength through the DC, and the DC gained political strength because of the Catholic Church 
(DiMarco 2009:4). 
 
In 1948, the DC won 48.5 percent of the votes, and 305 of 574 seats in the national election. 
This was an absolute majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. No other party has 
done this after the DC (Killinger 2002:161). This shows how powerful the DC actually was. 
When Giovanni Spadolini was elected Prime Minister in 1981, this was the first non-DC 
Prime Minister in 35 years. This is another example of how powerful and influential the DC 
was (Killinger 2002:167). 
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Although the DC possessed much power and influence, the relationship between the Catholic 
Church and the Italian state underwent some changes during the post-war era. A new 
Concordat was made in 1984, revising formal Church-State relations. This had not been done 
since the Concordat of 1929. One of the results of the new Concordat was that Catholicism 
ceased to be the official religion of the Italian State. Religious teaching was no longer 
compulsory in State schools, Church property became taxable, and State stipends for priests 
were phased out. Despite the fact that 90 to 95 percent of the students opted for religious 
teaching in schools, and that donations to priests were facilitated, the Concordat caused 
changes in the Church-State relations. Thus, one can say that the Church lost considerable 
political power (Clark 1996:405). This could be seen as a change in the Church’s impact. Less 
impact through political parties would force the Church to think differently, and develop new 
strategies. If the new Concordat was a sign of less political power, the Catholic Church could 
develop strategies that were less concerned about making an impact through a political party, 
and more concerned about making an impact through people’s personal lives. The reason for 
the changes that were made in the Concordat, have been attributed to social and political 
change over decades. DiMarco (2009:5) claims that this can be viewed in two ways. Either 
the Church distanced itself from Italy because it did not want to be linked with the changing 
ideals in Italy. Or, the state sought to modernize and thus distanced itself from the Church. 
 
The DC had some connections which was worthy of criticism. Some say that the DC had 
close connections with both the Sicilian mafia, Cosa Nostra, and the Neapolitan mafia, 
Camorra (Gilmour 2011:364). To gain votes and influence in both Naples and in Sicily, these 
were powerful connections. Given the authority of the Cosa Nostra in Sicily and Camorra in 
Naples, this may have had a significant meaning for the DC. Absalom (1995:283) writes that 
there was a resurgence of Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta and the Mafia (Cosa Nostra), after the 
alliance between them and the DC had been broken at the end of the 1980s. The resurgence 
can be interpreted as a sign of the close ties between the DC and the Sicilian, Neapolitan, and 
Calabrese mafia. As long as the alliance existed, the Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta and the Cosa 
Nostra were less visible. Further on, Absalom (1995:284) writes that the mafia had been given 
protection from the law in exchange for control of the southern electorate. 
 
Some would say that the DC lost many of its supporters because there were far fewer small 
farmers and practicing Catholics in 1980 than in 1948 (Gilmour 2011:344). In other words, 
the support for the DC was not as large in the 1980s as in the 1940s. From 1976 to 1983 alone 
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the DC went from 38.7 percent to 32.9 percent of the votes for the Chamber of Deputies 
(Nilsson 1987:91). Despite this, it was expected that the DC would stay in government for a 
long time. Some would even say that the prospects were better for the DC after the record low 
support in the 1983 elections (Nilsson 1987:55-56). The DC did have an upturn in the 1987 
Italian general elections, winning 34.3 percent of the votes, compared to 32.9 percent in 1983. 
The party also won nine more seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Hine 1987:269). However, 
something would interrupt the reign of the DC. The next decade would see the downfall and 
the end of the DC. 
 
Note that the Catholic Church did not only have political authority through the DC. The Popes 
has also expressed the concerns of the Church through speeches, encyclicals, encouragement, 
and letters to political figures (DiMarco 2009:2). Although the Catholic Church exerted 
substantial power through the DC, it also publicly spoke on issues which concerned it.  
 
One of the most significant religious events in the twentieth century was the Second Vatican 
Council. Called by Pope John XXIII (1958-63), the Second Vatican Council took place 
between 1962 and 1965. The Second Vatican Council was an assembly of Roman Catholic 
bishops. Observers from other Christian churches and communities also took part in it. Pope 
John XXIII wanted to heal divisions within Christendom, change the reactionary attitude of 
the Church toward the world, and update and spiritually renew the Catholic Church. For over 
three hundred years, many Catholics had viewed the Church as a perfect society. The Second 
Vatican Council made Catholics view their Church differently. The need for a continued 
reformation was recognized by the bishops (O’Collins 2014:6). During the Second Vatican 
Council, four constitutions were made. The Dogmatic Consitution of the Church (Lumen 
Gentium), Pastoral Constitution of the Church (Gaudium et Spes), Constitution of the Sacred 
Liturgy (Sacrosanctum Concilium), and the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation (Dei 
Verbum) (O’Collins 2014:6-8). The constitutions included teachings of the Catholic Church. 
Parts of the constitutions will be cited in the analysis chapter. 
 
4.4  Referendums During the Post-War Era 
 
In the 1948 Italian constitution, provisions for a popular referendum had been written. 
However, the law had never been approved and implemented. The DC began the process of 
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getting the law implemented when the debate on a law on divorce was discussed in the late 
1960s. From 1972 it was possible to submit laws to a popular referendum in order to repeal or 
modify them (Seymour 2006:205). 
 
Before summing up this chapter, two referendums will be given attention. The first is the 
1974 referendum on divorce. The second is the 1981 referendum on abortion. These were two 
referendums in which the DC and the Catholic Church suffered defeats. 
 
4.4.1   The 1974 Referendum on Divorce 
 
In 1970, a bill introduced divorce into Italian law. Divorce became legal, although only under 
highly restrictive circumstances (Volcanzek 2001:356). The law was subject to years of 
debate before it was introduced into legislation. Restrictions on the law were also placed by 
the DC. After the law had been introduced, a group of Catholics formed a committee and 
proceeded to gather a large number of signatures. It submitted the law to a popular 
referendum (Marradi 1976:115). The committee was founded by Professor Gabrio Lombardi, 
and named the National Committee for a Referendum on Divorce (CNRD). Lombardi was a 
professor at the Catholic University of Milan, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Seymour 
2006:214). Although it was Lombardi and the CNRD who submitted the law to a popular 
referendum, this tactic was not new. This tactic had been drafted at the Bishop’s Conference 
as early as in 1967 (Seymour 2006:205). 
 
The referendum was feared by the secular camp. Officially, the country still consisted of 99 
percent Catholic, and the influence of the Catholic Church was high. Several secular party 
leaders feared that the secular front could suffer a defeat. They feared the influence which 
appeals from both the Pope and clergy might have. The Communists feared that some of their 
followers would vote according to how the Catholic Church encouraged them to vote. If it had 
only been the DC which encouraged voters to repeal the law, there would not be a big issue. It 
was a different matter when the Pope and clergy encouraged people to vote in favor of 
repealing the law (Marradi 1976:116). Catholic organizations supported the DC in the attempt 
to repeal the law, and to get a referendum on the ballot which requires 500 000 signatures 
(Volcansek 2001:357). The CNRD gathered the signatures. It did so with the blessing of 
Italian bishops, and the help of a broad network of Catholic organizations. Although 500 000 
votes were required to submit the law to a popular referendum, the CNRD collected 1 370 
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134 signatures in total. It did so with the help of other Catholic organizations (Seymour 
2006:214). Although the number of signatures do not say anything of the influence of the DC, 
it says something about the network and mobilization potential of Catholic organizations. The 
factors mentioned showed in itself that there was support in favor of the referendum. In 
addition to this, the Communists feared that this might affect their relationship with the 
Catholic Church. Even though the DC was clearly anti-communist, the Communists had voted 
for the implementation of the 1929 Concordat into the Italian constitution in 1947. In this 
way, the Communists stood out from the other secular parties, and it was a part of a long-term 
policy of conciliation with the Catholic Church. The conciliation could now be at stake 
(Marradi 1976:116). 
 
It was also feared by the religious camp, but for a different reason. With the support of 
Catholic organizations, the DC felt confident in that the law could be repealed through the 
referendum (Volcansek 2001:357). If, however, the outcome of the referendum should not go 
the way they wished, it could strike another blow to the DC. This could be seen as a weakness 
of the influence of the DC. During the campaign prior to the referendum, there were two 
parties which advocated that the law should be repealed. The DC, and the Italian Social 
Movement, or Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI). MSI was a neo-fascist party. Besides the 
two political parties, the Catholic Church was also advocating support to repeal the law. 
Bishops were much involved in mobilizing their followers. The Pope, on the other hand, was 
hesitant to give his full authorization in the struggle (Marradi 1976:116).  
 
The vote resulted in 50.9 percent of the electorate, or 59.1 percent of those voting, voted “no” 
to repeal the law (Marradi 1976:117). The voter turnout was 87.7 percent (Uleri 2002:864). 
During the campaign prior to the vote, the Catholic Church had encouraged their adherents to 
vote “yes” on the referendum. The DC, bishops, and the clergy encouraged to repeal the law. 
In spite of this, the referendum was not successful, and the attempt to repeal the law did not 
succeed. 
 
4.4.2   The 1981 Referendum on Abortion 
 
The first of many referenda related to reproduction was considered in 1976. At the time, 
abortion was illegal in Italy. Political parties in favor of the abortion laws tried to reform it, so 
that the law would not be submitted to a referendum. These parties did not want to risk the 
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referendum to reach the people, and thus risk that it was repealed (DiMarco 2009:6-7). The 
DC proposed a new version of the law, but one where abortion was still defined as a crime. 
Debates and negotiations took place, and a new proposal was agreed upon. This new proposal 
stated that abortion was no longer criminal. The law was implemented in 1978 as law 194 on 
The Social Protection of Motherhood and the Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy (DiMarco 
2009:7). 
 
As expected, the Holy See was against this (DiMarco 2009:7). When the abortion law of 1978 
was implemented, the Catholic Church took a personal stance against it. In addition to the 
political authority of the Holy See, through the DC. The Holy See promoted respect for all 
human life (DiMarco 2009:2-3). In this way, the Catholic Church appealed to the people by 
making it clear how they value all human life, and in addition, it exerted political influence 
through the DC. 
 
In 1981, two referenda were held on abortion. One of them, issued by the secular side, sought 
to liberalize the law on abortion. The other, issued by the Catholic side, sought to restrict the 
law on abortion. Among the political parties, the DC and MSI supported the referendum to 
restrict the law on abortion. All other parties supported the referendum to liberalize the law on 
abortion (Bardi 1981:282). 
 
The referendum to liberalize the law were promoted by the Radical Party, or Partito Radicale 
(PR). On the opposite side, the referendum to restrict the law on abortion was initiated by the 
DC, and supported by the organization Movement for Life (Bardi 1981:282). And, as 
mentioned, backed by the MSI. Once again, the DC supported a referendum to repeal a law 
on an issue that is important to the Catholic Church.  
 
Neither of the referenda succeeded. In Italy, for a referendum to be valid a minimum of 25 
percent voter turnout of the registered voters is required (DiMarco 2009:12). The turnout was 
79.4 percent on both. While 68 percent voted “no” on restricting the law on abortion, 88.4 
percent voted “no” on liberalizing the law on abortion (Uleri 2002:864). Although the 
referendum to restrict the law on abortion failed, there was a greater opposition to liberalize 
the law on abortion. However, the failed referendum to restrict the law on abortion was a 
defeat for the DC. 
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The referendum on restricting the law on abortion did not go in favor of the Catholic Church. 
After this, the Vatican has stayed away from trying to restrict the law on abortion. DiMarco 
(2009:13) claims that the Vatican now chooses battles they are more likely to win. How the 
Catholic Church has tried to affect Italian politics through referenda after the First Republic, 
shall be discussed in the analysis chapter. 
 
4.5  Tangentopoli and Mani Pulite 
 
In 1993, a corruption scandal was uncovered. The scandal involved bribes being paid by 
businessmen to party leaders. Among these was the leader of the Socialist Party, Bettino 
Craxi. The scandal is known as Tangentopoli, or in English, bribesville. Tangentopoli shook 
the foundations of the Italian republic.  
 
A drive for fundamental change in the political system was mobilized. In Milan, a series of 
investigations started, which was called mani pulite, or in English, clean hands. The scandal 
would include several party leaders besides Craxi, including Giulio Andreotti and Arnaldo 
Forlani from the DC. One-third of the members of Parliament would eventually be involved 
during the mani pulite. Even though the scandal came as a shock to many Italians, corruption 
associated with politicians was not something new. Already in the late 1970s president 
Giovanni Leone had to resign due to corruption. Leone was a DC politician (Gilmour 
2011:364). In other words, the DC were no strangers to corruption among party members. 
 
The Tangentopoli scandals revealed how political power had been abused, specially by the 
party leaderships. This led to two things in particular. The destruction of the old parties, and a 
change in the post-war political system. When making a new constitutional reform, an 
important aspect was the electoral system. Proportional representation (PR) guaranteed an 
equitable representation, both also made majority government impossible. Because of this, 
party leaders in this corrupt system would trade favors for power. Referendums were 
submitted to move Italy from PR at all levels of government. The referendums of 1991 and 
1993 gained a large majority of the votes, thus replacing PR with winner-take-all elections in 
local governments, and three-fourths of the seats in Parliament (Killinger 2002:169-170). 
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Following the Tangentopoli scandal, the DC was dissolved in 1994 (Gilmour 2011:365). The 
DC had maintained supremacy for more than forty-five years (Killinger 2002:168). After the 
biggest Christian party was dissolved, other parties with a Christian profile tried to gain 
support. No other party succeeded in getting the same support as the DC once had. 
Tangentopoli brought an end to the DC era of Italian politics. It also meant that the Catholic 
Church could no longer influence Italian politics through a political party with the same 
amount of impact. The attempts of other Christian parties showed that a new party would not 
have the same influence. After the second world war, the Catholic Church could influence 
Italian politics through the party system, and the DC. Developing strategies to influence 
Italian politics is something the Catholic Church had been doing throughout the post-war era. 
However, their most effective way of influencing Italian politics had been through the DC. 
After Tangentopoli, they had to rely on other strategies.  
 
4.6  In sum 
 
The Catholic Church and the Italian state did not have a good relationship at the time of the 
unification of Italy. A unified Italy would mean the end of most Papal States. Pope Pius IX 
was unhappy about this. In 1874 the Vatican decreed the Non Expedit, which forbade all 
Catholics from participating in Italian national politics. The Law of Papal Guarantees was 
issued in 1871. The Church and State were separated, but this law also ensured protection of 
the Church. Even though the Pope’s privileges were extended to the equivalent of a head of 
state, Pius IX scorned the offer and declared himself “a prisoner of the Vatican”. 
 
The Non Expedit formally applied until 1919. In 1919 the PPI contested in its first election. 
PPI had the Vatican’s support, and thus the Non Expedit ceased to apply. 
 
During Mussolini’s Fascist regime, the Church and government reached an agreement in the 
Lateran Treaty. Both the Church and Mussolini gained from this. The Church got autonomy 
for the Vatican, and more freedom and benefits for Catholic schools and organizations. In 
spite of this, the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Fascist regime was not 
unproblematic. Mussolini would later try to place limits on the Catholic Church, and the 
Catholic Church openly criticized regime politics, like for example the racial laws. 
Nonetheless, the relationship between the Italian state and the Catholic Church was more 
	   	   42	  
stable than it had been since unification. This period was the first time the Catholic Church 
was directly active in politics since the time of the unification. 
 
After the second world war the Catholic Church affected politics through the DC. The DC had 
the support of the Vatican. It was largely successful and maintained supremacy for more than 
forty-five years. Through the DC, the Catholic Church could affect policy and to a large 
degree set the political agenda. At one point, in 1948, the DC won an absolute majority of the 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies, which no party have done later. This shows the great 
support the party enjoyed. Criticism can be voiced due to unfortunate connections to the 
mafia and corruption among party members, but the DC were very influential nonetheless. 
Between 1962 and 1965, the Second Vatican Council took place. Roman Catholic Bishops, 
and observers from other Christian churches and communities took part in it. Four 
constitutions were made during the Second Vatican Council. Among other things, these 
included the teachings of the Church. In 1984, a new Concordat was made. This revised 
formal Church-State relation. With the new Concordat, Catholicism ceased to be the state 
religion. During the 1980s the support for the DC both decreased and later rose. Despite a 
decreasing support for the DC during the early 1980s, scholars were optimistic about its 
future. It was expected that the DC would have a great amount of electoral support for a long 
time. However, things changed in the early 1990s. 
 
Two laws on issues that are important to the Catholic Church were subjected to popular 
referenda during the post-war era. The first was the 1974 referendum on divorce. In 1981 the 
second law was subjected to referendum. This was the law on restricting abortion. Both 
referendums failed to repeal and restrict the laws, despite being promoted by the DC and the 
Catholic Church. 
 
When the corruption scandal known as Tangentopoli was revealed in 1993, this lead to the 
end of the DC. Several leaders of the party were involved in the scandal. However, corruption 
was not a new thing within the DC. DC president Giovanni Leone had to resign in the 1970s, 
due to corruption. Tangentopoli and mani pulite led to electoral reforms. The old PR system 
was abolished. The scandals also led to the dissolution of several of the old parties, including 
the DC. In 1993 the second republic began, and this is where my thesis will have its focal 
point. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis 
 
So far in the thesis, we have looked at a brief historical retrospective for the case of Italy and 
how the Catholic Church has influenced Italian politics from the time of unification to the fall 
of the First Republic. The following chapters put forth theories on the subject, and described 
the applied method for the research. In this chapter, the analysis will be conducted. 
 
The analysis will focus on three strategic ways in which the Catholic Church influences 
Italian politics. First, through party politics. Second, through Catholic organizations and 
movements. Third, through popular referenda. 
 
5.1 The Catholic Church and Party Politics 
 
In the chapter where we looked at which ways the Catholic Church influenced politics prior to 
1992, the DC was an essential part of the post-war era. After the DC dissolved there was 
uncertainty of how the Catholic Church would react in terms of influence through party 
politics. Would the Catholic Church try a different strategy, or hope to influence a new party 
in the same way? The DC dissolved, and its members spread, but which parties did the former 
DC politicians join? In this part of the analysis I will discuss the road ahead for the DC 
politicians, which parties followed the DC, and Lega Nord’s attempt to gain support from 
Catholic voters. Then I will discuss why the Catholic Church can no longer be a major 
influence through political parties, and what the consequences of this is. 
 
5.1.1 The Road Ahead for the DC Politicians 
 
Following the dissolution of the DC, the party split into several different parties. The Social 
Christians called Cristiano-sociali (C-S) contested in the 1994 elections in the Progressive 
Alliance coalition. They would later join several other parties to found the Democrats of the 
Left or Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS). The PDS along with Verdi (the Greens), 
Lista Dini (Dini List), and Popolari, made up the Olive Tree (Ulivo) coalition. Popolari was 
made up of the PPI which was the largest successor of the DC, Romano Prodi who ran as an 
independent candidate, the Democratic Union or Unione Democratica (UD), and the South 
Tyrolese People’s Party or Südtirolervolkspartei. The Olive Tree was headed by former DC 
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politician Romano Prodi (Newell 2000:32:36-37). I will go more in depth about the Olive 
Tree coalition later in this chapter.  
 
It seems that the Catholic Church did not try to support former DC politicians at all costs. If a 
former DC politician had political views which were not consistent with the Vatican, their 
background as a DC politician was seemingly useless. Former DC politicians could not expect 
to be endorsed by the Vatican, exclusively because of their DC background. An example of 
this is Romano Prodi. Prodi and his relationship to the Vatican will be discussed more in 
depth, later in this chapter. 
 
The PPI was the largest remnant of the DC, following its dissolution. While the name is the 
same, it does not have anything to do with the PPI founded in 1919. Except that the PPI which 
succeeded the DC was also a Christian Democratic party. But the party must not be confused 
with the one which was founded by Don Luigi Sturzo in the pre-fascist era (Donovan and 
Gilbert 2015:394). Following the first republic, the PPI was considered the successor party of 
the DC which was dissolved in 1994. With a new electoral system, the PPI faced a strong 
competition on both the Left and the Right. The new electoral system used winner-take-all 
elections in local governments, and in three-fourths of the elections for Parliament. This 
replaced the old PR system. The new electoral system guaranteed a better representation for 
the small parties. Thus, it was impossible to form majority governments (Killinger 2002:169-
170). As mentioned, the PPI faced competition on both the Left and the Right. The DC had 
been located in the center, and so was the PPI. In the new electoral system, coalitions formed 
on the Left and the Right. The coalitions in the 1994 general elections were the Alliance of 
Progressives, or Alleanza dei Progressisti, on the Left, and the Pole of Freedoms, or Polo 
delle Libertà. Even though the PPI joined the coalition Pact for Italy, or Patto per l’Italia, 
there was no room for a coalition in the center. 
 
Single-member constituencies were now being used. Although the PPI won a fair share of the 
votes, they won few seats, due to single-member constituencies. The poor results were 
predictable, but still a defeat for the party (Hopkin 2015:327-8). The low electoral support for 
the PPI was not unexpected. When the expectations became reality, it was clear that the 
Catholic Church could not influence Italian politics through a political party in the same way 
as during the First Republic. If the Church still had its mind set on doing this, it was at least 
certain that the PPI was not the way to go. Without the PR electoral law of the First Republic, 
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the political challengers of both the Left and the Right were too big. The theory of Duverger’s 
Law says that single-member districts produce two-party systems. During the 1996 general 
elections there were not two grand parties, but two grand coalitions (in addition to the smaller 
Lega Nord) which competed for seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. These were 
the Polo delle Libertà, led by Silvio Berlusconi, and the Ulivo, led by former DC and PPI 
member Romano Prodi (Hopkin 2015:329-30). The PPI lacked electoral support, and did not 
succeed in the elections. One of the main reasons for the lack of success for the PPI was that it 
did not try to join neither the Ulivo, nor Polo delle Libertà.  
 
As mentioned above, some members of the DC formed the PPI in 1994. PPI and Pact for 
National Renewal or Patto Segni (Pact) would form the coalition named Pact for Italy, or 
Patto per l’Italia (1994-1996) (Newell 2000:31-32 and 207-208). Patto Segni would only 
contest in the 1994 general elections, where it won 4.6 percent of the votes (Berntzen 
2013:273). 
 
In 1994, the right-wing of the DC formed the Christian Democratic Center, or Centro 
Cristiano Democratico (CCD). During its first election, in 1994, the CCD joined the lists of 
Forza Italia (FI). In the elections of both 1996 and 2001, the CCD and the Christian 
Democratic Union, or Cristiani Democratici Uniti (CDU), had a joint list for the elections. It 
won 5.8 percent of the votes in 1996, and 3.2 percent of the votes in 2001. The CCD and 
CDU formed the Union of Christian and Centre Democrats, or Unione dei Democratici 
Cristiani e di Centro (UDC) in 2002 (Berntzen 2013:274-275). We shall take a closer look at 
the UDC later in this chapter. 
 
5.1.2 The legacy of Catholic political parties and coalitions after 1992 
 
After the dissolution of the DC there were two small successor parties that appeared to be able 
to contest elections. This was from 1995, and in particular from 2001-08.  
 
The formation of the Olive Tree coalition in 1995 led to a split in the PPI. Rocco Buttiglione 
formed the CDU instead. Former DC member Gerardo Bianco led the PPI into the Olive Tree 
coalition. Romano Prodi put himself as the leader of the Olive Tree coalition. In the 1996 
elections, he managed to mobilize support from progressive Catholics, and the coalition 
brought together the parties of the center-left (Newell 2000:206). From 1996 to 2001, the 
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Olive Tree coalition was in government. In the 2006 general elections, the Olive Tree 
Coalition won 31 percent of the votes, and was in government once again (Berntzen 
2013:272). The Olive Tree coalition had several leaders who served at different times, and the 
coalition gave the center-left a banner to gather around until the foundation of the PD in 2008 
(Donovan and Gilbert 2015:394). 
 
The PPI was a principal successor to the DC. In 2001-2 the PPI was fused with other minor 
centrist parties, which were more or less Catholic. These were the Italian Renewal, or 
Rinnovamento Italiano (RI), I Democratici, and the Union of the Democrats for Europe, or 
Unione Democratici per l’Europa (UDEUR) (Berntzen 2013:275). This became the 
Margherita-Democracy is Freedom (Margherita-Democrazia è Libertà). In 2008-9, the 
Margherita-Democracy is Freedom fused with the post-communist Democrats of the Left, or 
Democratici di Sinistra (DS). Together, they cofounded the Democratic Party, or Partito 
Democratico (PD). With the forming of the PD, the Margherita-Democrazia è Libertà 
abandoned its Catholic identity. Following the Tangentopoli scandal, the PPI, as mentioned 
above, was the principal successor to the DC. Despite this, it took 14 to 15 years before the 
party would abandon its Catholic identity. Although it was now expanded (Donovan 
2015:194-5). 
 
Even though the Margherita-Democracy is Freedom gained some political power as a part of 
the Ulivo coalition in 2001, the ideology of the DC’s successor party faded away. The shift 
from the PPI’s original Catholic identity, to the Margherita-Democracy is Freedom began to 
dissipate the Catholic identity. This identity was completely erased with the founding of the 
PD. This could be an indication of the changes in Catholic parties, and Catholic politicians in 
Italy after the First Republic. Even though the PD did not, and does not, have a Catholic 
identity, several of its leaders are devout Catholics, and several of them are former DC 
members. As for example Matteo Renzi and Dario Franceschini. In addition to having Enrico 
Letta, a former DC politician, in the Prime Minister position from 2013-2014. It seems as 
even though the Catholic identity is absented from the PD, a large number of its members are 
Catholics. I will go further in depth on the changes in political Catholicism later in the 
chapter.   
 
The UDCs forerunners were the CCD which was formed in 1994, and CDU which was 
formed in 1995. Both CCD and CDU had formerly been allied to Silvio Berlusconi. In 2007, 
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the UDC gained their independence when they refused to join Berlusconi’s new party, the 
People of Freedom, or Il Polo delle Libertà (PdL). In 2008, the UDC allied with other 
fragments, with whom most were Catholic. These parties became the Union of the Centre, or 
Unione di Centro (UdC). The UdC was the only political formation to gain parliamentary 
representation in 2008 which were not allied to neither the PDL nor the PD. Further on, the 
UdC had to make a choice on how it would identify itself. The UdC attempted to form a new 
Catholic party. This gained the interest of some ministers, successful Italian business and 
financial leaders, and a significant group of Catholic interest group leaders. Despite the 
interest of these influential leaders and ministers, the attempt to form a new improved 
Catholic party was not as successful as it may have hoped. The Catholic hierarchy chose to 
give only limited support. This support was also ambiguous.  
 
Another way the UDC sought to gain votes, was through the government of Mario Monti. 
Monti’s Civic Choice list, or Scelta Civica (SC), allied with the UdC in 2012, because of his 
decision to seek electoral legitimation as a political leader. At this point, the UdC was a 
clearer centrist party. A single list was presented in the Senate to overcome the 8 percent 
threshold. The list was presented under Monti's name. As a result of the 2013 Italian general 
elections, 19 senators were elected from the SC. Among these 19, only two were from the 
UdC. Pierferdinando Casini was one of these. Casini had been an important figure, and the de 
facto leader of the Catholic center-right since 1994. The UdC didn't fare better in the 
Chamber of Deputies. A distinct UdC list was presented. This was squeezed to just 1.8 
percent of the vote. The 1.8 percent gave the UdC eight seats in the Chamber of Deputies. To 
form an officially recognized group in the Senate, ten are required. In the Chamber of 
Deputies, 20 are required. This meant that the UdC was eight too few in the Senate, and 
twelve too few in the Chamber of Deputies. As a result of the defeat in the 2013 Italian 
general election, the UdC was too small to form an officially recognized group in either 
Chamber. This meant an end to a distinct Catholic presence in the Parliament (Donovan 
2015:194-95).  
 
Although small, the UdC had represented a Catholic presence in the Parliament from its 
foundation and until the 2013 general election. After the 2013 general election, Catholic 
presence went from small to non-existing in the Parliament. Especially given that also the PPI 
had merged with other parties into the Margherita-Democracy is Freedom, and eventually the 
PD. The PD had no Catholic identity, as mentioned above. In the 2013 general elections, the 
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UdC won 1.3 percent of the votes (Berntzen 2013:280). And, as mentioned above, did not win 
enough seats in either Chamber to form an officially recognized group. Even though the UdC 
has had low political influence in the Parliament after the 2013 general election, the party has 
not been dissolved. Nor has it abandoned its Catholic identity. 
 
The UdCs representation in the Parliament gives a glimpse of how much the Catholic Church 
can affect politics through political parties. A quick comparison shows us that even if we 
compare a year in the DC-era in which the DC had low support, it is still much larger than the 
support the UdC enjoyed in the 2013 general elections. In 1983, the DC won 32.9 percent of 
the votes for the Chamber of Deputies (Nilsson 1987:91). The UdC, in comparison, won 1.8 
percent of the votes for the Chamber of Deputies in the 2013 general elections (Donovan 
2015:194-95). Prior to the Tangentopoli scandal, the 1983 general elections were the election 
with the poorest results for the DC. Yet, when the DC won 32.9 percent of the votes for the 
Chamber of Deputies, this cannot be considered a defeat. Even scholars at that time were 
optimistic about the future of the DC. Although the results were considered poor, they were 
expected to rise again (Nilsson 1987:55-56). Could one hope for a rise in the results of 
political parties with Catholic identities today? If we briefly sum up the history of political 
parties with Catholic identity after 1992, we can raise the question if this is in the Vatican's 
interest. The DC was dissolved in 1994. Following the Tangentopoli scandal, the party could 
no longer exist and enjoy the success it had enjoyed during the post-war era. Its legacy was 
wounded too badly. The newly founded PPI, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, was its 
natural successor. Several members of the DC were involved in the foundation of the PPI. 
The PPI was also centrist and a clear Christian democratic party. However, none of the 
successor parties to the DC even came close to the success of the DC. This is shown in Table 
1 later in this analysis. 
 
It seems far-fetched to define the LN as a Catholic party, but because they have tried to attract 
Catholic voters through some political issues, I will include a section on them. 
 
The LN is one of the parties that wished to claim the role as defenders of the Catholic identity 
of Italy after the dissolution of the DC. Since 1943, the DC had proclaimed that Italy should 
be a Christian, democratic country. This implied that Catholic principles should inspire state 
activities. The DC had taken up the task of defending the Catholic identity of Italy. With the 
disappearance of the DC, the LN was now eager to take on the task. The LN originated from 
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an area where the DC had enjoyed great support. This is the so-called White Belt of Italy. It 
comprises the northern regions of Lombardia, Veneto, and Friuli Venezia-Giulia. From the 
late 1990s, the LN began to pay great attention to the religious values. Their electoral 
manifesto from 2013 states among other things that they want freedom of education and 
religion, and that they support the marriage between a man and a woman. These were themes 
that at first looked like principals found in papal documents. If we look deeper, some of these 
issues had hidden motives as well. For example, the claim for freedom of religion was not a 
claim for freedom of all religions. The LN wanted to limit the establishment of mosques, and 
it has criticized organizations for having tolerant attitudes towards Muslim communities. This 
shows that the LN does not have a friendly attitude towards Muslims, and the claim for 
freedom of religion, in their view, could be considered limited to Catholicism or Christianity. 
Another way the LN has tried to take the role as defenders of Catholic cultural identity of 
Italy, is with demands for social solidarity. Once again, the hostile attitudes towards Muslims 
and migrants, and accusations on how migrants who receive social services keep needy 
Italians from benefiting from the same, show that these are not unequivocally Catholic values. 
The Catholic values would not exclude migrants from social services, or blame them for using 
social services at the expense of Italian citizens (Bolzonar 2016:458-9). 
 
According to Bolzonar (2016:459), there are two reasons why the political use of Catholic 
values by the LN does not seem consistent with the political Catholicism promoted by the 
DC. The religious arguments used by the LN are used to reach goals of non-religious value. 
To a large degree, this includes gaining votes. Bolzonar claims that the religious symbols are 
used for profane reasons, and set aside from their religious context. One can read this as the 
Catholic values themselves are not promoted to defend the Catholic identity of Italy, but to 
gain votes for the LN. The second reason is that while the Catholic Church pointed out the 
Catholic ideal of a universal social solidarity, the LN opposed it. Particularly in the case of 
immigration. The LN on the one side was against the acceptance of migrants, while the 
Catholic Church on the other side blamed Italian politicians for not devoting enough attention 
to the suffering of migrants. Bolzonar concludes by claiming that the Catholicism of the LN 
in the political arena is a spurious form of Catholicism. This form of Catholicism will only 
pay attention to Catholic conservative ideals which will help the LN gain votes.  
 
The LN is not in any way a successor party to the DC. Nor is it a party with endorsement 
from the Vatican. In addition to its aim of gaining more autonomy for the northern regions, 
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the LN can be defined as a populist party, more than a Catholic party. It is reasonable to 
expect that the promotion of some of the Catholic values exist for gaining votes. Not to 
become a new Catholic party with the support of the Vatican. The LN does not promote itself 
as a Catholic party either, but seems to attract some Catholic voters. 
 
Before moving on to the discussion of why the Catholic Church can no longer be a major 
influence through political parties, a table will be presented with election results for some 
chosen parties and coalitions. The table is meant for a comparison of how many percentage of 
votes the DC gained in 1992, and how many percentage the parties which followed gained in 
the next two elections. The table shows election results up until 2013, and in this way, we can 
look at the results from all of the successor parties. FI is included for two reasons. First, the 
CCD joined the lists of FI during the 1994 Italian general elections. Second, because of the 
close ties between the Vatican and Berlusconi which we shall see later in this chapter. Lega 
Nord is included because it has to some degree promoted Catholic values, and it seem to 
attract Catholic voters. The PD is also included. Both because it is a successor to the 
Margherita-Democracy is Freedom, but also because of the role of Matteo Renzi, whom will 
be written more about. Data is collected from Berntzen (2013:273-275). The numbers 
represent the percentage of votes won by the party. The results of the Catholic parties are 
written in bold. 
 
By looking at the table, we can see how the PPI never managed to come close to the number 
of votes gained by the DC. FI/PdL has gained over 21 percent of the votes in every election 
since 1994, with especially good elections in 2001 and 2008. We can also see that the PD won 
25.4 percent of the votes in the 2013 election, making it the second largest party after the 
Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), which is not included in the table (Berntzen 2013:274). It is clear 
that the Catholic parties such as the PPI, the CCD/CDU/UDC/UdC, and Patto Segni, has had 
low electoral support. Especially when compared to the DC. The PPI won just over 11 percent 
of the votes in the 1994 general election, but as mentioned earlier, it resulted in few seats due 
to single-member constituencies. After this, the Margherita-Democracy is Freedom is the only 
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Table 1. Election results from 1992 to 2013 
 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013 
DC 29.7 - - - - - - 
PPI - 11.1 6.8 - - - - 
Patto Segni - 4.6 - - - - - 
CCD/CDU/UDC/UdC - - 5.8 3.2 6.8 5.6 1.8 
FI/PdL - 21.0 21.0 29.4 23.7 37.4 21.6 


















PD - - - - - 33.2 25.4 
 
 
5.1.3 Why the Catholic Church Can No Longer Be a Major Influence Through Political 
Parties 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Catholic Church had a major influence through political parties 
between 1945 to 1992. Before moving on to the next part of this analysis, we shall look at 
some major reasons why the Catholic Church can no longer be an influence on Italian politics 
through political parties, to the same degree that it was from 1945 to 1992. 
 
Following the Tangentopoli scandal, several major structural changes were made in the Italian 
political system. Thus, making the transition from the First to the Second Republic. Compared 
to the post-war era, from 1946 to 1992, some attributes of the Italian party system had 
changed. During the post-war era, there were a high number of political parties, with great 
distances among them. The DC occupied the center throughout the period. And the 
competition for the executive was closed. After 1992, there were changes in the party system. 
Even though the party system became increasingly fragmented, two large pre-electoral 
alliances emerged. These alliances integrated the new moderate successor parties to once 
extremist parties. For example, the Italian Communist Party, or Partito Comunista Italiano 
(PCI), was succeeded by the Democratic Party of the Left, or Partito Democratico della 
Sinistra (PDS). The PDS had closer ties to social-democratic parties. In addition, the 
Communist Refoundation Party, or Partito Rifondazione Comunista (PRC) was also a 
	   	   52	  
successor to the PCI. However, the PRC was substantially smaller than PDS.  The center once 
occupied by the DC was now empty. And between 1994 and 1996, closed competition for the 
executive ended and open competition began (Mershon 2015:145).  
 
Devout Catholic politicians are not bound to join Christian democratic parties. This differs 
from the DC era. In the DC era, most Catholics who were active through political parties, and 
at the same time regularly attended mass, were members of the DC. The other grand parties, 
were the communist party (PCI), the socialist party (PSI), and the Italian Social Democratic 
Party, or Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (PSDI). During the governments of the DC, 
the party formed coalitions with several other parties. If a devout Catholic were to enter the 
political arena, it was more natural for that person to join the DC. Especially considering that 
the PSI and PSDI were often in coalition with the DC anyway, although they enjoyed less 
support. After the dissolution of the DC following the Tangentopoli scandal, and after the 
dissolution of the PPI, this has changed.  
 
With the two large pre-electoral alliances that emerged after 1992, there was a greater 
competition for electoral votes. A strong center was no longer present. Following the 
dissolution of the DC, several new Catholic parties were founded. But at this point none of 
them could even be compared to the DC in neither power nor size. This could be one of the 
reasons why Catholic politicians were no longer eager to join Catholic parties. The large 
alliances may have been more attractive to Catholic politicians. This may have been more 
attractive to young politicians than to the ones that were a part of the DC. Romano Prodi, for 
example, joined the PPI after the dissolution of the DC, even though he joined other non-
Catholic parties later.  
 
Romano Prodi has arguably had the most influential political career of the DC politicians who 
made a transition to other parties following the Tangentopoli scandal. Following his career in 
the DC, Prodi was a member of the PPI from 1994 to 1996. Later, he varied from being 
independent from political parties to being a member of the Democrats (I Democratici) and 
later the Democratic Party, or Partito Democratico (PD). During this time, Prodi has served 
as Prime Minister on two occasions. First from 1996 to 1998, then again from 2006 to 2008. 
During both terms, he was a part of the Olive Tree coalition. The first term, however, Prodi 
was not affiliated to a political party. During the second term, Prodi became an official 
member of the PD. Prodi was not, however, an official member at the start of his time in 
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office. Despite being a former member of the DC, Prodi did not enjoy a great deal of support 
from the Vatican. 
 
Young Catholic politicians who entered the political arena after the Tangentopoli scandal, do 
not seem compelled to join a Catholic party. Matteo Renzi is a perfect personified example of 
this. Renzi is a Catholic who regularly attend mass (Diotallevi 2016:485). Renzi is the 
secretary of the PD, and served as the Prime Minister of Italy from 2014 to 2016. He is 
described as a Catholic politician. Yet he does not make appeals to a clear Catholic ideology. 
This has been described as a symptom of this era (Bailey and Driessen 2016:422). Political 
parties with a clear Catholic ideology is almost non-existent compared to the DC era. The fact 
that young Catholic politicians do not consider it natural to join a party with a clear Catholic 
ideology, is not a positive sign for the future of Catholic parties. But this does not mean that 
the Catholic Church cannot affect politics through politicians.  
 
If we take a better look at Matteo Renzi, it is interesting to see how he identifies with a lot of 
the typical Catholic values, with some exceptions, but still represents a center-left party. 
Renzi is described as a progressive, yet not someone who only theorizes things. Being in 
favor of civil unions of same-sex couples, Renzi has taken a different path than the Catholic 
Church on this question. This conflicts with the opinions of the Catholic Church as well as 
Pope Francis. Renzi’s government also backed a bill to speed up divorce. We cannot say that 
this is something that Renzi personally fought for, but the bill was criticized by the bishops in 
Italy. At the same time, Renzi has personal values and political opinions that can easily be 
identified as Catholic values. Renzi has encouraged politicians to embrace simpler lifestyles. 
Also, Renzi argued that the state has a responsibility to help the poor, and called for more 
liberal immigration laws. This is similar to values and opinions which Pope Francis has 
expressed during the years of his papacy. According to political commentator Ernesto Galli 
della Loggia, Renzi focuses on concrete challenges, he is both efficient and compassionate, 
kind and simple, and open to the ideas of others. Galli della Loggia has an interesting view on 
how this may be the only kind of Catholicism that is capable of being translated into politics 
in today’s Italy, the era of Pope Francis (Allen 2014). This can be interpreted as to say that 
party political Catholicism is not possible in Italy today. The opinion of one political 
commentator cannot be considered an undisputed fact, although it gives us a point of view 
which is worth discussing. 
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Given the situation of the Catholic parties in Italy today, it appears as though individual 
Catholic politicians can affect politics at least as much if they are not members of a Catholic 
party, as if they are. Young Catholic politicians seem comfortable governing without being a 
member of a party with a clear Catholic ideology (Bailey and Driessen 2016:422). Some 
scholars have suggested that the demise of the DC made it possible for the ideological 
influence of political Catholicism to spread to all parties. In doing this, it would result in a 
larger influence of Catholic ideals on Italian politics than what the DC itself ever had (Bailey 
and Driessen 2016:424). The influence of Romano Prodi in the Olive Tree, and the PD, is an 
example of this. Renzi, as mentioned above, is also an example of this. A Catholic politician 
such as Renzi can influence the non-Catholic PD with elements of Catholicism. This does not 
mean that the PD will have a Christian democratic ideology, but political Catholicism will no 
longer be centered around one large Christian democratic party, as it were in the DC era. 
Instead of having one Christian democratic party of the size of the DC, with so to speak the 
only influence of Catholic ideals, Catholic politicians spreading across several parties means 
that Catholic ideals can be included in Italian politics from different parts. 
 
Bolzonar (2016:450-451) proposes that there has been a Christian democratization of politics 
in Italy. There has been a Christian democratization of social coalitions, liberal-oriented 
parties, and the Lega Nord. This is shown by the incorporations of Catholic values in their 
ideologies. Studying this provides insight into the structural transformation on both political 
Catholicism and Italian politics. After the demise of the DC, there has been a transformation 
in the identity of existing political parties. Bolzonar claims that the persistence of Catholic 
values in society, in addition to among other things the transformation of identities of political 
parties mentioned above, has led to a Christian democratization of politics in Italy. It has also 
changed political Catholicism in Italy. 
 
This leads us to another question. Is Catholic party politics a thing of the past? Is it no longer 
possible for the Catholic Church to make a major impact on Italian politics through political 
parties? Some scholars will claim that the collapse of the old party system have radically 
changed the relations between the Catholic Church and Italian politics, which were 
established in the post-war era (Livi 2016:400). I will concur that the structural changes made 
from the First to the Second Republic radically changed the relations between the Catholic 
Church and Italian politics. Even though the Catholic Church can still influence Italian 
politics through political parties, this will be, and has been, more difficult in the Second 
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Republic than the First. In addition to being more difficult, it does not seem as something the 
Catholic Church is interested in. As mentioned in the chapter 2, when addressing the Polish 
episcopate in 1993, Pope John Paul II said (Nash 2000:7) that: 
 
“the Church is not a political party nor is she to be identified with any political party; 
she is above them, open to all people of good will, and no political party can claim the 
right to represent her”. 
 
5.2 Catholic Organizations and Movements 
 
Religious organizations, movements and interest groups are some of the channels through 
which the Catholic Church can affect politics. Through organizations and movements, the 
Catholic Church can affect politicians, and try to set an agenda for political causes of 
importance to the Church. As mentioned in chapter 2, interest groups can give support to 
political parties (Warner 2000:98). It is clear that this is something the Catholic Church did 
during the post-war era. During the post-war era, the Catholic Church supported the DC, 
which made a great impact on the power and influence of the DC on Italian politics. This 
again gave the Catholic Church great influence on Italian politics. As mentioned in the 
previous part of the analysis, the Catholic Church does no longer support political parties in 
the same way as during the post-war era. This can partly be explained by the institutional 
changes made in the transition from the First to the Second Republic. But what strategies does 
the Catholic Church use to affect Italian politics after 1992? In this part of the analysis, I shall 
write about how the Catholic Church has affected Italian politics through religious 
organizations, movements and interest groups. 
 
As early as in 1982, Pope John Paul II recognized that Catholic movements were central to 
containing a drift toward secularization (Santagata 2014:441). This shows that Vatican 
influence through Catholic organizations is not a new phenomenon. In the historical 
retrospective chapter, I wrote about the Catholic organization of laymen called Catholic 
Action. Catholic Action has influenced politics in several respects throughout the history of 
Italy. During the Fascist regime, Catholic Action was a constant reminder to Mussolini that 
his totalitarian regime was incomplete. Catholic Action gained more influence after the 
second world war. Originally, the DC was, as mentioned earlier, mainly a coalition of laymen 
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from Catholic Action. It increased in both numbers and influence, up until the time of the 
Second Vatican Council. This shows that Catholic organizations has been influential in the 
past as well. Even though the Catholic Church could influence Italian politics through the DC 
during the post-war era, it has also used organizations in the civil society. As shown in the 
historical retrospective chapter, the Catholic Church was even expanding among the civil 
society during Mussolini’s regime. Even though it is not a new phenomenon, I will discuss 
how the Catholic Church has used Catholic organizations, interest groups, and movements, to 
a larger degree after the fall of the First Republic, compared to earlier in the history of Italy. 
 
After the transition from the First Republic, there was no longer a clearly identifiable Catholic 
party. At least none which could compare to the DC. The PPI, which was the natural 
successor of the DC, could not rally enough electoral votes to gain enough political power to 
make a great impact. Instead, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, many Catholics were divided 
in how they cast their votes. Many Catholics voted for Prodi, while many others voted for 
Berlusconi. Some scholars argue that in the absence of a clear Catholic party, the Catholic 
Church changed its strategy. From now on, the Catholic Church would no longer use a 
political party to influence politics and affect policy making, as it did during the post-war era. 
Instead, the Catholic Church adopted a strategy of a much more public voice, than during the 
post-war era (Bailey and Driessen 2016:420-421).  
 
There is an impressive number of Catholic-inspired associations and initiatives, acting in the 
political arena as interest groups (Diotallevi 2016:489). It is not granted that all of these 
associations and initiatives fosters political ideas. In addition, these associations and 
initiatives will vary in how much they will push to affect Italian politics. Some to a much 
larger degree than others. Nonetheless, a large number of Catholic-inspired associations and 
initiatives are active in the political arena, and they exert influence. It can also be argued that 
the Vatican will exert influence through these associations and initiatives. The influence that 
the Vatican has on Catholic-inspired organizations should not be underestimated. 
 
5.2.1 Communion and Liberation 
 
When reading about influential organizations connected to the Catholic Church, there is one 
religious movement that regularly appears. This is the Catholic movement Comunione e 
Liberazione, or Communion and Liberation (CL). The CL was founded in 1954 by Luigi 
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Giussani. It spread quickly throughout Italy after being formed in Milan. It is a movement, as 
the CL itself defines it, because it does not have the form of a structure or organization 
(Rondoni 2000:18). 
 
It is not only local in Italy. At the time of the CL’s thirtieth anniversary, it had spread to 18 
countries (Rondoni 2000:136). By the year 2000 it was present in 70 countries in the world 
(Rondoni 2000:18). In this thesis, I shall focus on the CL in Italy, but this shows how lare the 
movement is worldwide. 
 
Since 1954, the CL has become widely known as an important Catholic movement with high 
influence. During the last 15 years, the political power of the CL has significantly increased. 
The CL is involved in activities over a broad specter. They range from grassroots meetings to 
service provision and business activities (Giorgi and Polizzi 2015:133). It has been described 
as a Catholic movement that intends to enhance its political and professional presence in 
society (Garelli 2007:27). 
 
One of the reasons why the CL has such a great influence is because it is deeply rooted at the 
local level (Giorgi and Polizzi 2015:133). When the movement is rooted at the local level, it 
reaches a broad range of people. Some people may trust leaders of such movements more than 
they trust politicians. And thus, a movement such as the CL can enjoy more trust and 
influence among people when it is rooted at the local level, instead of only having close ties to 
politicians. If the Catholic Church attempts to influence politics, or people’s vote in the case 
of a referendum, it is desirable that it could to this on several levels. A movement such as the 
CL could in such cases be very useful. 
 
In the chapter which looks at the historical background of Italian politics, the Non Expedit of 
1874 was mentioned. The Non Expedit prohibited Catholics from participating in national 
politics. The CL claims that Christians should engage in society, both actively and critically 
(Giorgi and Polizzi 2015:133). In 1919, the Non Expedit formally ceased to apply. The CL 
represents a change of attitudes with regards to how the Catholic Church, and Catholics, view 
their role in society in terms of involvement. This especially applies in political matters. Not 
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that the CL in any way has been responsible for that change, but it is a clear example of how 
the involvement of Catholics in politics has changed. Catholics are not only involved in party 
politics, but actively engage in movements as for example the CL. For Catholics to engage 
actively in society is, as mentioned before, something that the CL sees as a responsibility. 
This is in line with how the CL has always viewed politics as a natural field of Christian 
commitment. That is the way they have, and always had, a political engagement (Giorgi and 
Polizzi 2015:143).  
 
The political role of religious organizations was almost exclusively connected to the DC 
during the First Republic. Through civil activism in society, by mobilizing Catholics in both 
public and political life, and through commitment, religious associations supported the party 
(Giorgi and Polizzi 2015:135). After the DC dissolved, the political focus of religious 
organizations was at a crossroad. They could either continue to give support to a Catholic 
party, or choose different ways of affecting politics. Unlike during the First Republic, not all 
religious organizations opted for the same way to play their political role. The CL seized the 
opportunity to gain influence through a political party in the wake of the First Republic. When 
Forza Italia became the largest party following the 1994 election, the CL seized an 
opportunity. FI had grown very popular with its charismatic leader, Silvio Berlusconi. 
However, the FI lacked organization and political leaders at the local level. The CL took 
advantage of this. In the aftermath of the First Republic, some of the political leaders of the 
CL had gathered in the CCD. The CCD was a small party consisting of former DC members. 
The party did not, however, have an alliance, and its electoral strength was weak. Two 
months prior to the regional elections in 1995, the CL allied with FI. The CL promoted 
Roberto Formigoni as candidate for the presidency in Lombardy. The Polo delle Libertà 
coalition won the regional election in Lombardy and Formigoni became president of 
Lombardy. Formigoni and CCD, the party which the CL endorsed, winning the presidency 
can to a large degree be credited to the cleverness of the CL to ally with FI. Through skilled 
local leaders and activists, the CL was able to fill in the organizational weaknesses in the 
coalition, and in turn win the presidency of Lombardy. This in turn made it possible for the 
CL to make its key issues among the coalition priorities (Giorgi and Polizzi 2015:135). As 
mentioned in the second chapter, interest groups vary in how, and what kind of, support they 
give to political parties. They may endorse candidates, or the party itself (Warner 2000:98). 
Prior to the 1995 regional elections, the CL chose to support CCD and promote Formigoni as 
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president of Lombardy. In this, they succeeded.  
 
Through the Polo delle Libertà, CL members in CCD could influence politics, and affect 
policy making. But this is just one example of how the CL has operated. Through 
relationships with politicians in the CCD the influence of the CL grew. The CL also gained a 
great amount of influence through lobbying activities with political parties within the center-
right coalition, as for example FI (Giorgi and Polizzi 2015:135). This is an example of how 
the Catholic Church can affect Italian politics through a Catholic movement. The CL itself is 
not a political party, but it has close ties with politicians within political parties. In addition, it 
has a restrained relationship with political parties whom they influence through lobbying 
activities. By having close ties with politicians, and through lobbying activities with political 
parties, the CL can exercise a major influence on Italian politics. Giorgi and Polizzi 
(2015:134) claims that the CL’s annual meetings is one of the most important public moments 
of the movement. Both high-level public and political personalities are invited to these 
meetings. This shows the broad network of the CL, and demonstrates how far their 
connections reach. Because the CL is not only deeply rooted at the local level, but their 
connections reach up to high-level politicians and public figures, it can influence on different 
levels. 
 
As mentioned above, the influence and political power of the CL has grown over the past 15 
years. Could this be an indication of the shift in strategies by the Catholic Church, from 
influencing politics through party politics to other arenas? The growth of the CL is an 
evidence that Catholic organizations and movements play a relatively larger role after the fall 
of the First Republic, compared to the post-war era.  
 
The CL wishes to make a statement of their religious identity in society (Garelli 2007:29). 
Already in the 1970s they were changing the debate from debating issues related to forms of 
political actions, to those which concerned faith as a form of social identity (Santagata 
2014:440). By focusing on faith as a form of social identity, it can be argued that this affected 
the shift in how Catholics operate in politics. With this focus, it may have been the case that 
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politically active Catholics became more aware of how they can influence regardless of which 
political party they are affiliated with. A realization that they are not obliged to join a political 
party which has a clear Catholic identity, but that they can be devout Catholics, and still be 
active in a party without a clear Catholic identity.   
 
The relationship between the Vatican and the CL has generally been close. In 1982, the CL 
received pontifical recognition. This was viewed as a confirmation that Pope John Paul II 
(1978-2005) liked the movement (Santagata 2014:440-441). At the time of its thirtieth 
anniversary, Pope John Paul II addressed the CL. Pope John Paul II was full of praise in his 
address. His address was mainly directed towards the work which the CL did to promote the 
Gospel of Christ. But still, Pope John Paul II recognized that the presence of the CL was ever 
more consistent and meaningful, not only in the Church of Italy, but also in the various 
countries where they began to spread. In addition to the work of spreading the Gospel, Pope 
John Paul II also gave them credit for opening to diverse situations. The call for commitment 
in collaboration with other movements in the Church, in addition to bishops and parish 
priests, shows a mutual desire for collaboration between the CL and the Church (Rondoni 
2000:131-137). Even though the CL has grown significantly in both influence and political 
power over the last 15 years, we can see that its collaboration with the Vatican has existed for 
a long time. As early as in 1977, Pope Paul VI (1963-78) blessed the Florentine university 
students of the CL, and the founder Luigi Giussani (Paul VI 1977). In addition to Pope John 
Paul II, Pope Benedict XVI (2005-13) addressed the CL numerous times (Communion and 
Liberation 2011). And most recently, Pope Francis addressed the CL on its fiftieth 
anniversary. This took place on St. Peter’s Square (Pope Francis 2015). As we can see, the CL 
has had ties with the Vatican for a long time. These ties have seemingly only grown closer 
each year. Pope Francis’ address to the CL on St. Peter’s Square can be a symbol of this. First 
and foremost, the different Popes have given the CL credit for their evangelical work, but as 
we have seen, this is not the only arena in which they engage. 
 
The CL has been critical to the secularist idea that faith should be something private and 
individual. Christians should be active in society, without fear of being critical. Over the last 
15 years, the CL has had a great deal of success, and has had increasing power and visibility 
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(Giorgi and Polizzi 2015:133-135).  
 
5.2.2 Conferenza Episcopale Italiana and Ruinismo 
 
Conferenza Episcopale Italiana (CEI) is the Italian Episcopal Conference. The CEI and its 
presidency, which I will discuss in depth later, had a clear papal mandate. It could be argued 
that the CEI had closer ties to the Vatican, than the CL, based on its papal mandate. 
 
From the time of the third National Ecclesiastical Meeting in Loreto in 1985, the CEI received 
more power and influence than ever before. It was based on a papal mandate, and assumed 
leadership to a greater extent than what had previously been seen assigned to an inter-
diocesan institution by official ecclesiology. This was something new in Italian ecclesial, and 
social, history. The leadership of the CEI adopted several new policies to play this role. This 
included a strong leadership at the national level of the Catholic religious authority structure, 
in addition to the great expansion of this authority. By doing this, they incorporated sectors 
which were in principle assigned to the lay apostolate. It particularly assumed exclusive 
control of interactions with political and, above all, state officials. Even though it did not have 
a political offer, the CEI leadership played an important role on the political market. Some 
scholars would describe them as the strongest clericalist group in Italy of all time (Diotallevi 
2016:500). 
 
Camillo Ruini studied at the Pontifical Gregorian University, and his career began in the 
Church of Emilia. During his study, he made contacts with important members of the DC. In 
Emilia-Romagna, Catholics were in a minority in the political arena, but Ruini was not 
unknown to Church leaders (Santagata 2014:441). This can be due to Ruini’s connections.  
 
The term Ruinismo refers to the era when Ruini was president of CEI (1991-2007). In 1986, 
Ruini was appointed secretary of CEI, and this was the beginning of Ruinismo (Santagata 
2014:442). After having served as secretary for approximately five years, Ruini was 
appointed president of the CEI in 1991. Ruini remained president until 2007. As mentioned 
earlier, the Catholic Church changed its strategy after the dissolution of the DC. The strategy 
now adopted, included a more direct, public, and political voice from the Catholic Church. 
Some scholars have referred to this phase as the Ruinismo. One of Ruini’s tasks was to 
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defend specific Catholic values. The values that Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI 
termed valori non negoziabili (non-negotiable values) (Bailey and Driessen 2016:421). The 
task given to Ruini shows what Bailey and Driessen (2016:421) claims is a more direct public 
voice from the Catholic Church. After the dissolution of the DC, no political party is entrusted 
with the task of defending non-negotiable values. The task is entrusted to the Cardinal, and 
president of the CEI, Camillo Ruini. This is an example of how there has been a change in the 
ways in which the Catholic Church tries to affect Italian politics. Important tasks are no 
longer given to political parties, but rather to political movements and organizations. The CEI 
is one of them. How the Catholic Church and the CEI operated in cases such as the 
referendum against assisted reproduction, will be discussed in the next part of the analysis. 
 
Before the years of Ruinismo, an objective was to maintain a Catholic political unity. Ruini 
had a different view on this matter. Ultimately, there was a change of perspective in the case 
of whether or not to try to maintain Catholic political unity. Ruini recognized that the 
fragmentation left after the dissolution of the DC could make CEI more influential, and 
increase its scope of action. In addition to getting rid of the formula of Catholic political 
unity, Ruini developed a new media strategy. This included a newspaper, a television channel, 
conventions and cultural events. Through this there were two things in particular which 
occurred. The CEI grew in strength. Media operations helped the CEI gain more power. It 
became more visible, and thus more influential. In addition to this, the size and strength of the 
CEI was identified with Ruini, who was president, and not the secretary general (Melloni 
2015:420-21). Ruini’s development of the media strategy resembled that of Berlusconi. Not in 
scope, but they both increased their visibility and influence by using the media. Berlusconi to 
a much higher degree than Ruini, but this was a clever move from Ruini nonetheless. Through 
it, he increased the power and influence of the CEI, and at the same time established a strong 
association between the CEI and himself. 
 
During the 1990s, Ruini and the CEI considered Berlusconi, and right-wing politicians, to 
better guarantee public visibility for the Church. Particularly on the non-negotiable values. By 
doing this, they gave right-wing politicians the chance to be defensor fidei (defender of the 
faith). A task, which I mentioned in the previous part of the analysis, similar to the one the 
Lega Nord wished to claim. Even though Berlusconi and the right-wing was given a chance to 
take on this task, they were not fitting to the principles of the Catholic Church. And neither 
was the LN. The main contender to Berlusconi was Romano Prodi. Not only was Prodi a 
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skilled politician who held the Prime Minister position in two different periods, but also an 
exemplary Catholic. Prodi also had a background in both the DC and the PPI. This was not an 
easy task. In addition to this, Ruini tried to reduce the communication within the CEI. By 
weakening the communication within the CEI, it can be argued that it would be an easier task 
for Ruini to gain support to promote Berlusconi and the right-wing. An unconditional support 
from Pope John Paul II made these tasks achievable (Melloni 2015:421). Ruini succeeded in 
ensuring the downfall of Prodi’s government in 2008. There was a political clash between 
Ruini and Prodi (Diotallevi 2016:505). Prodi was occupied with issues concerning 
institutional reform and health, while Berlusconi supported issues that was important to the 
Catholic Church (Livi 2016:404). It was, for example, Berlusconi’s government that in 2004 
introduced the law on assisted reproduction (Santagata 2014:445). Berlusconi opposed 
abortion, assisted reproduction, and he promoted the traditional family. These were some of 
the non-negotiable values. This led the Vatican to support Berlusconi over Prodi (Bailey and 
Driessen 2016:421). This shows how strong the influence of Ruini, and the Ruinismo were. 
Prodi, a devout Catholic, lost the support of the CEI in favor of Berlusconi, a liberal, populist 
with no political background prior to 1994. Berlusconi would in many ways be viewed as an 
opposite to Prodi. Prodi had an academic background, he is a family man, and one with few 
controversies during his political career. Berlusconi was a business man, and his political 
career would be marked by many controversies. There are many examples of the influence of 
Ruini. One on them is how he persuaded the CEI to support Berlusconi over Prodi. This also 
shows his strong impact and persuasive skills. 
 
Diotallevi (2016:486) states that one of the key elements of Ruinismo was the mobilization of 
Catholic representatives in both the Camera dei deputati (Chamber of Deputies), and the 
Senato della Repubblica (Senate). These were frequently mobilized on single issues. Unlike 
the support of the DC, these representatives can be mobilized to affect issues regardless of 
whether these issues have been proposed by the Left, Right, or Center. Whereas the DC as a 
party had the support of the Catholic Church, during the Ruinismo the support can be given 
regardless of parties. In this way, the Church does not need to support the Left, Right, or 
Center, but can defeat majorities on both the Left and the Right. As exemplified with Matteo 
Renzi in the previous part of the analysis, there are many Catholics in the Italian political 
arenas. This does not only apply in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. At every 
administrative level, there is a high number of Catholics among the locally elected. With the 
Catholic Church no longer supporting a single Catholic party, but rather mobilizing Catholic 
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politicians, it can be argued that the Catholic Church can affect politics on a broader level. 
Instead of previously affecting through the DC which was a centrist party, the Catholic 
Church can influence politics through politicians on the Left, Right, and Center. And the 
Catholic Church can make a great influence through mobilizing Catholic politicians at the 
local administrative level as well. 
 
In 2013, Pope Francis appointed Nunzio Galatino as Secretary General of the CEI. This has 
widely been seen as ending the Ruinismo period (Bailey and Driessen 2016:421). Even 
though Ruini’s presidency ended in 2007, it was not until the appointment of Nunzio Galatino 
as Secretary General of the CEI that it was regarded that the Ruinismo period had ended. 
 
5.2.3 Catholic Movements, Organizations and Interest Groups’ Influence on Italian 
Politics 
 
The influence of both the CL and the CEI increased after the First Republic. Without the 
presence of a single Catholic party, it can be argued that the increasing influence of these 
movements are linked with the absence of a Catholic party. We can see a correlation between 
these two. The dissolution of the DC and the end of the First Republic made way for Catholic 
movements, organizations and interest groups to be more influential. The influence of the CEI 
can be linked to the appointment of Ruini as president as well.  
 
Several time periods throughout the history of Italy, the Catholic Church endorsed a Catholic 
party. However, grand Catholic parties such as the PPI of 1919, and to a larger extent, the DC, 
no longer exist. Instead, Catholics are represented in all parties. Both at the national, and the 
local level. In this way, there is a broader representation of Catholic interests in Italian 
politics. Political Catholicism does no longer exist in the same way as it has done in the post-
war era. Instead, Catholic politicians are represented to a larger degree across parties, and 
Catholic movements, organizations and interest groups are used to affect Italian politics to a 
much larger degree than during the First Republic. 
 
Some scholars claim that the Catholic Church has left the party for the pulpit (Diamanti and 
Ceccarini 2007:45). It can be difficult to say if this is true. But it seems clear that Catholic 
organizations, movements and interest groups are being used to a much larger degree to affect 
Italian politics, than during the post-war era, and even before that. It can be argued that 
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throughout the history of Italy, Catholic movements, organizations and interest groups have 




In the previous parts of the analysis, we have viewed how the Catholic Church have affected 
Italian politics through political parties, politicians, and religious organizations, movements 
and interest groups. The Catholic Church has also worked strategically towards different 
policies. An example of this is how the Catholic Church work with referendums regarding the 
non-negotiable values. Referendums increases the potential of churches to act politically 
(Fink 2009:84). The Italian constitution allows for popular referendums (Fink 2009:86). It 
was, however, first implemented in 1972. As shown in the chapter 2, referendums may be 
used in attempts to overturn already passed laws (Fink 2009:84). Referendums can also be 
used as a threat to influence policy-making. In this analysis, however, I shall focus on how the 
Church has attempted to use referendums in overturning, restricting, and maintaining laws. To 
clarify, to maintain a law in this case means to stop a referendum from overturning an existing 
law. This applies to the referendum in 2005 to overturn the law on assisted reproduction. The 
reason for the focus on these referendums is grounded in that these are the referendums that 
has been most vital to the Catholic Church. The referendums were submitted on the law on 
divorce in 1974, the law on abortion in 1981, and the law on embryo- and stem cell research 
in 2005. 
 
This part of the analysis examines how the Catholic Church has worked to affect the outcome 
of these three referendums. In particular, we shall go in depth of two cases during the First 
Republic, and one case after the First Republic. By doing this, we can compare the strategies 
the Catholic Church has used within this specific field after the First Republic. 
 
The three cases are concerned with the non-negotiable values. In each section, it will also be 
clarified why these cases are of such big importance to the Catholic Church. 
 
5.3.1 1974 Legalization of divorce 
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The first referendum that will be discussed, is that of the 1974 legalization of divorce. There 
are several reasons why this case was of grand importance to the Catholic Church. First of all, 
there are theological reasons. It is spoken of divorce several places in the Bible. To name one, 
Jesus speaks of divorce in Matthew chapter 5 verses 31 to 32. Family is an important value 
for the Catholic Church, and one of the non-negotiable values. Even though the term “non-
negotiable values" did not exist at the time. Second of all, politically- and historically based 
reasons. In the 1860s, civil marriage was introduced to parliament. Civil marriage 
distinguished itself from a marriage in the Catholic Church in several respects. While a 
marriage in the Catholic Church is considered a holy sacrament, a civil marriage was blessed 
by the laws of Italy (Seymour 2006:11-12). As a result of the Lateran Treaty in 1929, civil 
marriage was overturned (Seymour 2006:161). The Lateran Treaty stated that cases regarding 
annulment of, and dispensation from, marriage should be handled by ecclesiastical tribunals 
(Volcansek 2001:357). The law on divorce in 1970 would undermine the Lateran Treaty. I 
will not discuss these reasons any further. A theological discussion on divorce, and a 
discussion of the meaning of divorce related to the Lateran Treaty, and the influence of the 
Church, could be discussed for pages in itself. However, this is not relevant for the research 
objective of this thesis. 
 
In 1974, the DC enjoyed great support, as they did during most of the post-war era. Despite 
this, the 1974 referendum would mark a defeat for the DC. It was also a defeat for the 
Catholic Church, who wanted a different result. The case of the 1974 referendum was 
mentioned in chapter 4. It will be addressed more briefly in this section, compared to the 2005 
referendum. 
 
As mentioned in the previous part of the analysis, it is not a new phenomenon that the 
Catholic Church influences Italian politics through Catholic organizations. In chapter 4, the 
National Committee for a Referendum on Divorce (CNRD) was mentioned. The CNRD took 
the initiative to gather signatures in order to submit the law on divorce to a popular 
referendum. It managed to gather the signatures with the help of other Catholic organizations. 
There was a large network of Catholic organizations at the time. However, the idea of 
submitting the law to a popular referendum was not a new one. Even before the law on 
divorce was introduced, this strategy had been drafted at the Bishops Conference in 1967. 
This was also mentioned in chapter 4. Although it was the CNRD that took the initiative to 
submit the law to a referendum, the DC lay down the groundwork. At the time of the Bishops 
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Conference in 1967, the law of referendums had never been approved. Although a provision 
for popular referendums had been written in the constitution. The DC was immediately 
involved in the strategy drafted at the Bishops Conference. It was the DC who pushed for the 
law of referendums to be approved. In 1972, the law of referendums was approved. The idea 
was, in line with the strategy of the Bishops Conference, that a referendum would be used if a 
law on divorce was introduced. Seymour (2006:205) claims that this reflected the hierarchy of 
the Church, and how convinced the DC was that the majority of Italians was opposed to 
divorce. We have seen that the CNRD, in collaboration with other Catholic organizations, and 
with the blessings of the bishops, gathered the signatures in order to submit the law on 
divorce to a popular referendum. I would argue that despite this, the Catholic Church used the 
DC to influence politics. The DC lay the groundwork, making it possible to submit the law to 
a referendum in the first place. It would not be possible for the CNRD to submit the law to a 
referendum if the DC had not pushed for the law on referendums to be approved. 
 
Within the DC, a committee responsible for designing a strategic response to the proposal of 
the law on divorce was founded in 1969. The committee was coordinated by Giulio Andreotti. 
At that time, Andreotti was the president of the DC’s parliamentary group. Andreotti would 
later serve as Prime Minister in three different terms (1972-73, 1976-79, and 1989-92). 
Andreotti was one of the biggest opponents against the law on divorce (Seymour 2006:206). 
The process of repealing the law thus begun before the law had passed. It is clear that the DC 
did much to repeal the law, with one of their most profiled politician leading the battle.  
 
Leading up to the vote of the referendum, the Catholic Church and the DC tried to mobilize 
voters. The DC had the support of the Catholic Church, and the Church could in turn use the 
DC to influence the political arena (DiMarco 2009:4). Influencing the voters through the DC 
was one of several strategies used by the Catholic Church. Bishops were also much involved 
in trying to influence the voters. The DC had a political platform to influence their voters. 
They could appeal to their regular voters. At the 1972 general elections, the DC had received 
38.8 percent of the votes cast. This amounted in almost 13 000 000 votes (Clark and Irving 
1972:218). Because the DC enjoyed so much support, they had a major influence. With 
almost 38.8 percent of the electorate, it was beneficial for the Catholic Church to influence 
voters through the DC. However, this was not enough. As mentioned above, bishops were 
also much involved. The Pope, on the other hand, was hesitant to give his full authorization in 
the effort (Marradi 1976:116). There may be different reasons for why Pope Paul VI was 
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hesistant in the effort. It may have been because it was not common for the Pope to enter the 
political scene in such a direct way. However, the Pope did speak out publicly against divorce 
before the law had passed. The Pope also spoke against divorce to organizations and the 
ecclesiastical court (Seymour 2006:199). 
 
Even though the Pope was hesitant to give his full authorization in the effort to repeal the law 
on divorce, the Vatican tried to prevent the law proposal in different ways. These examples 
occurred before the law had passed. Seymour (2006:208) writes of two moves that were 
particularly influential. The first was a diplomatic note to the Italian ambassador in the Holy 
See. The second was on the 41st anniversary of the Lateran Treaty. This was a papal address 
which occurred at St. Peter’s. There, the Pope addressed the Senate, and said that a divorce 
law would wound the harmony between the State and the Church. This shows how the 
Catholic Church tried to address the Senate and representatives of the Italian state directly. 
 
Leading up to the vote of the 1974 referendum, the Church used what Nash (2000:1) calls 
direct and indirect influence. Indirect influence through the bishops, clergy and Pope. Despite 
the large electoral support for the DC, many Catholics supported socialists or communists in 
the 1960s and 1970s (Melloni 2015). This shows that the DC by itself could not reach out to 
all Catholics. After all, it was a political party with ties to the Catholic Church, and not 
religious leaders. The indirect influence through the clergy, bishops and Pope, was therefore 
crucial to gain more support. This was an attempt to influence individuals. Indirect influence 
and appeals by the Pope and clergy was also feared by most of the leaders of the secular 
parties. As mentioned before, many Catholics supported the communists. In the face of a 
referendum, the communists now feared that many of their Catholic voters would be loyal to 
their religion instead of their class. For those Catholics who supported the communists, it was 
now a question of where they stood on a principle issue. Not on whether or not to support the 
DC (Marradi 1976:116). Direct influence came through the close ties between the Catholic 
Church and the DC. Through the DC, the Catholic Church could affect the voters of the party. 
 
Both the Pope and the secretary of the DC, Amintore Fanfani, expected the law to be repealed 
(Melloni 2015:417). This made the outcome of the referendum an even more devastating 
defeat. In the case of the 1974 referendum, it was not issued by the Catholic Church but by 
the DC. For the DC, the failed referendum was a sign that it could not mobilize voters on this 
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issue. This came as a surprise because the outcome of the referendum was contradictory to the 
vote alignment given by the parties (Uleri 2002:868). 
 
Not all Catholics were in favor of the referendum. Catholics such as Pietro Scoppola and 
Giuseppe Alberigo was against the referendum. They believed that it was wrong to defend a 
theological principle such as this through civil law (Melloni 2015:417). It is likely that not all 
Catholics supported the referendum on divorce. For some it could be because they wished to 
get a divorce, or know someone who wished it. Based on the views of Scoppola and Alberigo, 
some Catholics may also have opposed the law because they do not believe it is right to 
defend a theological principle such as this through civil law. It can be argued that this group 
of Catholics would be more affected by the call of the Pope, bishops, or clergy, than that of a 
political party such as the DC. This group could also be more inclined to change their view by 
persuasion of a Catholic organization, compared to the persuasion of the DC. The CL, for 
example, was more concerned of faith as a form of social identity instead of political action. 
Despite this, the role of religious organizations during the First Republic was almost 
exclusively connected to the DC (Giorgi and Polizzi 2015:135). Even though Catholic 
organizations could affect the voters who opposed the law on matters such as those of 
Scoppola and Alberigo, they were likely connected to the DC. 
 
As mentioned in the historical retrospective chapter, there was another party in addition to the 
DC, which supported the referendum. The neo-fascist MSI. In the parliamentary debates, the 
MSI had also voted against the implementation of the law, and thus took the same stance as 
the DC (Marradi 1976:116). By encouraging its voters to vote in favor of repealing the law, 
the MSI could be offering support to the Catholic Church and the DC. However, the 
relationship between the DC and MSI was troubled. In 1960, the DC had tried to govern with 
the MSI. This was a disaster. Fernando Tambroni, Prime Minister in the that government, was 
forced to resign after four months in government. In 1972, Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti 
(representing the DC), and the DC secretary general, Arnaldo Forlani, rejected that the MSI 
could enter a center-right coalition. Indeed, it seemed as though the DC did not trust the MSI 
any more than they trusted the PCI (Clark and Irving 1972:214-215). This shows that even 
though the MSI and the DC took the same stand, in the parliament and the referendum, 
concerning the law on divorce, a collaboration did not exist. More votes in favor of the 
referendum may have been gained because of the MSI. During the 1972 general elections, the 
MSI won almost three million votes, or 8.7 percent (Clark and Irving 1972:223). Despite how 
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much support the MSI had among the voters, it is improbable that the Catholic Church tried to 
influence politics through the MSI. In this case, it would be to win votes in favor of the 
referendum. 
 
Based on theory, it would not be unlikely if the referendum had passed, instead of being 
defeated. Fink (2009:81-82) claims that the more religious the adherents of a church are, the 
more they are willing to act politically for religious causes. This makes the mobilization 
potential higher. In addition, Catholic adherents are often more religious than Protestants. The 
Catholic Church in Italy has many adherents, and its adherents are religious. It can be 
questioned why the referendum failed in spite of this. Empirical observations give us another 
perspective on mobilization potential. We cannot state that the mobilization potential of the 
Catholic Church is equally high regardless of the religious cause. For its adherents, some 
issues may be more personal than others. Therefore, we can say that mobilization potential is 
dependent on issues (Fink 2009:82). This is supported by Uleri (2002:871), who hypothesizes 
that the influence of parties is lower on ethical issues, such as divorce. In the case of the 
referendum on divorce, adherents could wish for a divorce themselves, and therefore refrain 
from voting in favor of the referendum (Fink 2009:82). Note that this may go the other way 
around as well. The Catholic Church can mobilize non-adherents for other issues. Research 
on embryos, for example, which will be discussed later in the analysis. Not all issues will 
affect the Church to act politically (Fink 2009:82). But there have been Catholic mobilization 
for referendums that are not based on theology. In 2011, two referendums were issued which 
served Catholic interests. These were on repealing the privatization of Italy’s water services, 
and the operation on nuclear power plants in Italy (Bailey and Driessen 2016:422). I have not 
discussed these referendums, as they are not a part of the non-negotiable values. Thus, they 
are harder to compare to the past, and I will argue they are not as important issues to the 
Catholic Church.  
 
5.3.2 1981 Referendum on Abortion 
 
In the eyes of the Catholic Church, life starts at the moment of conception. And from this 
moment, life must be safeguarded. This is specifically mentioned in the Gaudium et Spes. 
One of the constitutions made during the Second Vatican Council. The Gaudium et Spes 
states that “from the moment of its conception life must be guarded with the greatest care 
while abortion and infanticide are unspeakable crimes” (Paul VI 1965:51). Article 27 in the 
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Gaudium et Spes states that abortion, among other things, is opposed to life itself, and that 
this is an infamy (Paul VI 1965:27). This shows how important the case of abortion is to 
Catholics and to the Catholic Church. Involvement from the Catholic Church to repeal the 
1978 law on abortion therefore came naturally. 
 
Using a referendum in an attempt to repeal a law is not a strategy which is limited to political 
parties and the Catholic Church. The strategy can also be used by other interest groups 
(Immergut 1992:31). Although the DC initiated the 1981 referendum, they gained support 
from the organization Movement for Life (Bardi 1981:282). Indeed, it was Movement for Life 
that promoted the referendum to restrict the law on abortion (Uleri 2002:864-866). The 
Catholic Church was not pleased with the law either (DiMarco 2009:7). In addition to exert 
influence through the DC, the Catholic Church also expressed the concerns of the Church 
through the encyclicals of the Second Vatican Council, through speeches, and letters to 
politicians (DiMarco 2009:2). 
 
Pope Francis frequently speaks about abortion, and the value of life, and has addressed 
Movement for Life several times. In spite of this, former Movement for Life president, Carlo 
Casini, has said that the Catholic Church has been hesitant to take the question of abortion 
into the political arena (DiMarco 2009:14-15). 
 
We can see that in the case of the 1981 referendum on abortion, the Catholic Church once 
again used both direct and indirect influence. Direct influence once again came through close 
ties with the DC. The DC was the largest party in Italy, and during the 1976 Italian general 
elections it won 38.7 percent of the votes (Berntzen 2013:273). Through the DC, the Catholic 
Church had close ties with politicians in state positions. This occurred at the institutional 
level. As Nash (2000:1) states it is where direct influence occurs. Indirect influence was 
exerted through among other things, the encyclicals written during the Second Vatican 
Council. Through the encyclicals written during the Second Vatican council, and through 
speeches, the Catholic Church could influence individuals and the laity. 
 
5.3.3 2005 Referendum on Assisted Reproduction 
 
A new law which would later be challenged by a referendum, and gain great attention from 
the Vatican, was presented in 2004. The law was concerning regulations on assisted 
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reproduction. Some of the reasons why this was of big importance for the Catholic Church, 
are the same as in the case of abortion. Life starts at the moment of conception, and from this 
moment, life must be guarded. In this way, embryo research is wrong in the eyes of the 
Catholic Church. The law on assisted reproduction involved several things, as aforementioned 
embryo research, which concerns the non-negotiable values. 
 
At the time of the legislation, most countries in Western-Europe had regulated assisted 
reproduction. Indeed, the law does give access to assisted reproduction, but there are 
limitations on who it can be given access to. It can only be given to heterosexual couples. 
They must be of a fertile age. A donor is not allowed to provide sperm- or egg cells, and the 
couple may therefore only use their own sperm- and egg cells. In addition, the woman must 
have all created embryos implanted. Both healthy and diseased. The access to assisted 
reproduction in Italy is the most restricted in Europe (Fenton 2006:73-74). One of the main 
reasons for why all created embryos must be implanted is to prevent creating excessive 
embryos. Some would criticize the law for not allowing donated gametes. As will be shown 
later in this section, there are arguments as to why this is not allowed. One of them is that 
young women are being paid large amounts of money to be egg donors. Not allowing donated 
gametes can be based on an ethical argument in this respect (Sauer 2006:8). The argument can 
thus be presented regardless of theological views. 
 
Prior to the highly restrictive law in 2004, Italy had free access to assisted reproduction 
(Fenton 2006:74). Indeed, both patients and doctors could previously expect both full access 
to a variety of services from those who offered assisted reproduction (Sauer 2006:8). This 
makes it all the more interesting as to why the referendum failed. It can be due to different 
reasons. I will argue that the influence of the Catholic Church is the biggest reason. However, 
there will be counter arguments to how much influence the Catholic Church did exert. These 
will also be presented. Whether the Catholic Church or another factor was the most important 
reason for the failure of the referendum is not, however, the main objective of this section. 
Yet, it will be discussed to see whether or not the strategies were effective, and to show how 
large the influence of the Catholic Church was. The main objective is to show which 
strategies the Catholic Church used leading up to the 2005 referendum on assisted 
reproduction, and compare it to the 1974 referendum on divorce, and the 1981 referendum on 
abortion.  
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Sauer (2006:8) claims that stories about controversial cases and debates related to assisted 
reproduction has been a reason for skepticism among the public. He even claims that the 
practitioners of assistant reproduction are largely responsible for such a law.  
Divorce and abortion are two cases where the theological standpoint from the Catholic 
Church is clear. Yet, it can be argued that they are both cases that many Catholics can relate 
to. Some may have gone through a divorce, or taken an abortion. Most Catholics will at least 
know someone who has gone through at least one of the two. In the debate on assisted 
reproduction, however, comes issues that are less familiar to most people. Issues that easily 
draw skepticism. These issues include cloning, stem cell research, sex selection, and designer 
embryos. Cases of young egg donors being paid large amounts of money have also been an 
issue. An increasing use of fetal reduction is also a direct consequence of assisted 
reproduction (Sauer 2006:8). Another issue that easily draw skepticism is the impregnation of 
women who are past the age when they can have children naturally. The age restriction was 
also a direct cause of the work of Italian doctor Severino Antinori. Antinori used in vitro 
fertilization to impregnate a woman who was 62 years of age (DiMarco 2009:16). While it is 
easy to think of assisted reproduction as a means to help couples that cannot have children of 
their own, the list above represents a different view. It can be argued that if someone is in 
favor of helping couples have children by use of assisted reproduction because they cannot 
have children of their own, it does not necessarily mean that they are in favor of allowing 
them to select the sex of the baby. Selecting the sex of the baby, or designing embryos, could 
be viewed as a way of tampering with the embryos, and therefore less tolerated. 
 
Fenton (2006:75), on the other hand, claims that the law is interesting in more than one way. 
Not only is the law interesting because of how restrictive it is compared to other European 
countries. It is also interesting because it demonstrates the interaction between law and 
interest groups. In this case, interest groups means the Catholic Church. Fenton claims that 
the law is of great importance because Catholic doctrine has been very influential in designing 
it. The law also shows that national identity, heritage, and cultural perspectives, can be 
decisive on ethical and moral issues. Sauer (2006:8) also claims that the Catholic Church 
promoted a change in the law on, and research related to, assisted reproduction. DiMarco 
(2009:2) says the law was in favor to the Church. 
 
When the law on assisted reproduction passed in 2004, the center right government had 
support from parts of the opposition. The coalition in government at this time was the House 
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of Freedom, or Casa delle Libertà, led by Silvio Berlusconi (Berntzen 2013:281). It consisted 
of Forza Italia, the National Alliance, or Alleanza Nazionale (AN), the Lega Nord, the CCD 
and the CDU (UDC from 2002), the New Italian Socialist Party, or Nuovo Partito Socialista 
Italiano (NPSI), and the Italian Republican Party, or Partito Repubblicano Italiano (PRI). 
The politicians of the opposition who supported the law on assisted reproduction were mostly 
Catholics (DiMarco 2009:15). As discussed in the first part of the analysis, Catholics are no 
longer centered in one large Christian democratic party as they were in the DC during the 
post-war era. Catholic politicians are now spread across parties on both the Left, Right, and 
Center (Diotallevi 2016:486). The example shown here represents how the Catholic Church 
has successfully managed to use new strategies to influence Italian politics. When a law 
proposal, on a subject in which the Vatican is passionate about, is subjected to a vote in the 
Senate, it is not only a matter of Right versus Left. But the center-right government gained 
votes from the opposition. The opposition is not only the Left, but the far Right as well. As 
mentioned, most of the members of the opposition voting in favor of the law were Catholics. 
The strategy of the Catholic Church in terms of having Catholic politicians spread to all 
parties can thus be proven to be successful in this case. 
 
As shown in chapter 2, and earlier in this section of the analysis, empirical observations show 
that mobilization potential is strongly dependent on issues. We have seen that it can be 
difficult for the Catholic Church to mobilize its adherents to vote in favor of a referendum to 
repeal the law on divorce. This is due to many Catholics who are either divorced, in a difficult 
or abusive marriage, or for other reasons have a different view on divorce than the Catholic 
Church. In other cases, as mentioned, the Catholic Church can mobilize not only most of their 
adherents, but also many non-adherents. These are issues that may challenge people’s moral 
beliefs. The law on assisted reproduction is an example of this (Fink 2009:82). In the eyes of 
the Catholic Church, a human being is a person from the moment of conception, and so it 
must be treated. From this moment, the rights of the person must be recognized. The first one 
is the right to life. This includes the treatment of embryos. Embryos must be treated the same 
way as a person. It must also “be defended in its integrity, tended and cared for, to the extent 
possible, in the same way as any other human being as far as medical assistance is concerned” 
(Ratzinger and Bovone 1987:30). Not all Catholics do necessarily agree with the Catholic 
Church on this view, but many will do. In the eyes of many Catholics, the human being is a 
person from the moment of conception.  
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Non-adherents may also share this view. Even for the non-adherents of the Catholic Church 
who do not share this view, they may still be opposed to liberal laws on assisted reproduction. 
This is due to different reasons. For example, the reasons mentioned earlier. Impregnation of 
women who have passed the menopause is something unnatural, and one does not need to be 
a Catholic to think so. Selecting the sex of the baby, designing embryos, and stem cell 
research may easily draw skepticism among non-Catholics as well. Many non-adherents to 
the Catholic Church would think of it as unethical to use excessive embryos for research 
purposes. The argument of not using donated gametes, as mentioned above, is also something 
people can be opposed to, regardless of religion. One of the main reasons for this is the fear 
that young women will be tempted to donate eggs, and in return be paid a large fee. This 
could especially be tempting to poor women, and many non-Catholics as well as Catholics 
would find this unethical. Cloning a human being can for some people draw fascination. 
Among others it will draw skepticism and despise. It is something unfamiliar, and to be 
skeptical of it is not only reserved to Catholics. Non-adherents to the Catholic Church can 
easily draw skepticism on this as well. The empirical observations provided by Fink 
(2009:82) on how mobilization potential of the Catholic Church is issue-dependent, can in 
this case be supported. This does not, however, show which strategy the Catholic Church 
used. But it shows that the Catholic Church was able to mobilize both adherents and non-
adherents, as we shall see in the results of the referendum later. 
 
The strategy of the Catholic Church was different in 2005 compared to the 1974 and 1981 
referendums. In 1974, the DC, with support from Catholic organizations, attempted to repeal 
the law through a referendum. As shown in the historical retrospective chapter. The DC was 
confident that it would pass with the help of Catholic organizations (Volcansek 2001:357). 
During the campaign, the Catholic Church had urged people to vote “yes” on the referendum, 
to repeal the law. Bishops and the clergy also encouraged people to vote in favor of repealing 
the law. As we saw, this did not go the way they hoped. In 1981, the Catholic Church had 
already taken a stance against the law on abortion. When the law passed in 1978, the Holy 
See was determined to promote respect for all human life (DiMarco 2009:2-3). Once again, as 
in 1974, the DC had the support of the Catholic Church, and this time it also had the support 
of the organization Movement for Life. But once again the referendum failed. Regarding the 
2005 referendum on assisted reproduction, the strategy had changed. It was no longer a strong 
Christian democratic party which led the campaign against the referendum. Indeed, while a 
strong Christian democratic party was absent from the Italian political spectrum, the president 
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of the CEI, Camillo Ruini, was very much present. Ruini defended the values in which Pope 
John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI termed non-negotiable. This included opposition to 
assisted reproduction. It also promoted the traditional family (Bailey and Driessen 2016:421). 
One of the restrictions in the law on assisted reproduction was that only heterosexual couples 
could receive assisted reproduction (Fenton 2006:73). Single mothers and homosexual 
couples are not allowed to receive assisted reproduction. In other words, those who are not 
thought of as a traditional family.  
 
Diotallevi (2016:495) claims that the strategy used by the Catholic Church was in 2005 was 
opposite compared to the 1974 and 1981 referendums. First of all, it was promoted by a 
coalition of secular parties (Diotallevi 2016:495). Four million signatures were gathered by 
the Radical Party (PR), with the help of women’s rights groups, to bring the referendum to a 
vote. In addition to being opposed to the law on assisted reproduction, the women’s rights 
groups also feared that a failure of the referendum would lead to restrictions on the right to 
abortion (DiMarco 2009:20). The previous referendums had been promoted by the DC. 
Second of all, the strategy was no longer to encourage voters to cast a specific vote on the 
ballot, but to not vote at all. This strategy was not possible during the referendums promoted 
by the DC and the Catholic Church in 1974 and 1981, because in order to repeal the laws on 
divorce and abortion, a majority of the voters would need to vote “yes” in favor of the 
referendum. If the DC and the Catholic Church had encouraged voters to abstain from voting 
on the referendums to repeal to law on divorce in 1974, and restrict the law on abortion in 
1981, the referendums would have failed. And thus, the laws would not be repealed. It would 
be possible in the 1981 referendum promoted by the PR to liberalize abortion laws. However, 
it was not a strategy the Catholic Church relied on at that time. A constitutional rule states, 
that 50 percent voter turnout is required for the result to be valid (Uleri 2002:863). If the 
Catholic Church had encouraged people to vote “no” on the referendum, it would have to 
depend on the majority of the voters in doing this. The result would be more uncertain, and 
the Catholic Church would likely be worried that history would repeat itself. Regarding the 
2005 referendum, it can be seen as more strategically clever to encourage voters not to vote at 
all. Because the Catholic Church did not want to repeal the law, it did not need to call for a 
referendum. When it did not need to promote a referendum, it was not dependent on the 
referendum to pass. Therefore, it was possible to encourage the people to abstain from voting. 
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The Catholic Church thus used a new strategy in the case of a referendum on the non-
negotiable values. A political party, such as the DC, was no longer advocating how people 
should vote in the referendum. Priests urged their congregations to avoid voting. They would 
remind their congregations of the respect for life which the Catholic Church promoted. 
Bishops were campaigning to prevent the voter turnout from reaching the necessary 
requirement of 50 percent. Pope Benedict XVI (2005-13) announced his personal support for 
the campaign (DiMarco 2009:21). The personal support of Pope Benedict XVI to the 
Bishop’s campaign with regards to the 2005 referendum on assisted reproduction, differs 
from the referendum on divorce in 1974. Even though the bishops were much involved in 
mobilizing the followers of the Catholic Church in that case as well. Pope Paul VI (1963-78), 
however, was hesitant to give his full support in the struggle (Marradi 1976:116). The 
personal support of Pope Benedict XVI as well as the campaigns from the bishops, and the 
priests who urged their congregations to avoid voting, is what Nash (2000:1) calls indirect 
influence. Indirect influence was feared by the secularists prior to the 1974 referendum on 
divorce. During the campaign against the 2005 referendum on assisted reproduction, indirect 
influence was the main strategy to affect the voters. As mentioned in chapter 2, it is expected 
that how a Church intervenes in national politics is dependent on how it perceives its religious 
mission. It is suggested that Churches who see their role as moral and religious providers to 
individuals, are more likely to be indirectly influential in politics. On the other hand, 
Churches who see their religious mission as moral and religious guardians to a nation or 
society, is more likely to exert direct influence (Nash 2000:2). It can be argued that because 
the referendums of 1974 and 1981 occurred while Catholicism was still the State religion of 
Italy, the Catholic Church at that time chose to exert more direct influence. The religious 
mission of the Catholic Church was to be moral and religious guardians of Italy. Thus, when 
Catholicism ceased to be the official State religion, the religious mission of the Catholic 
Church changed to moral and religious providers to individuals. 
 
As mentioned earlier in this section, there were counter arguments as to how large influence 
the Catholic Church had on the failure of the referendum. And whether or not the failure of 
the referendum can be considered a success to the Catholic Church. The law had scientific 
constrains. These were complex and not all voters could fully comprehend them. Voter apathy 
is also mentioned as a contributing factor for the low voter turnout (DiMarco 2009:21). Even 
in medical communities, it is acknowledged that some of the issues were too complicated for 
most people to understand. And thus caused voters to stay home (Manna and Nardo 
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2005:532). Also, some would argue that because the referendum failed due to low voter 
turnout, it cannot be considered support to the Catholic Church (DiMarco 2009:30). It is easy 
to argue against this statement, given that the strategy of the Catholic Church was to 
encourage people not to vote. Among those who did vote, a large majority voted in favor of 
repealing some or all of the restrictions (DiMarco 2009:21). In spite of this, it is very likely 
that Catholics who would have voted against the referendum, would rather abstain from 
voting, due to the urging of the Catholic Church in doing this. For non-Catholics who was 
opposed to the referendum, this would be a smart strategy as well. If most Catholics abstain 
from voting, the chances are higher for the referendum to fail. The referendum is more likely 
to fail if everyone who would have voted against the referendum would not vote. Despite the 
counter arguments mentioned earlier, I will argue that the failure of the referendum can, at 
least to some degree, be considered a success to the Catholic Church. 
 
Diamanti and Ceccarini (2007:45) claim that the Catholic Church has left the party for the 
pulpit. By looking at the strategies used by the Catholic Church to influence the vote in the 
2005 referendum, it can be argued that they are correct in their claims. A direct influence 
through the DC, had been changed to an indirect influence through the Pope, bishops, and 
priests. The Catholic Church exerted influence during the referendums of 1974 and 1981 as 
well, but the DC was the biggest promoter. 
 
A clear Vatican involvement in Italian politics was heavily opposed by the public. Those who 
were pro-abortion protested and was alarmed that Pope Benedict XVI was personally 
involved in the political arena and encouraged people to boycott the vote. DiMarco (2009:21) 
says that many saw the referendum as a test of the influence of the Catholic Church in Italy. 
Further on, DiMarco (2009:24) claims that although some supported both the law on assisted 
reproduction, and the attempt by the Catholic Church to uphold it, others where against the 
involvement of the Catholic Church in politics. 
 
It is not a politician who has been credited for the strategy used during the 2005 referendum, 
but Cardinal Camillo Ruini (Diotallevi 2016:495). Because Cardinal Ruini has been given 
credit for this, one can credit this strategy to the Catholic Church instead of a political party. 
This also shows how the Catholic Church has used the CEI, and Ruini, to affect politics. 
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The objective of this thesis is not to discuss whether or not the strategies used by the Catholic 
Church, with an emphasis on the period after the fall of the First Republic, has been 
successful or not. However, in this case it can be argued that it has been. There were about 50 
million eligible voters in Italy, and only 26 percent cast their vote. As mentioned above, there 
are critics (DiMarco 2009:21; Manna and Nardo 2005:532) who claim that the election results 
of the 2005 referendum cannot only be credited to the Catholic Church. By looking at the 
means of how the Catholic Church urged people not to vote, however, I would argue that the 
Catholic Church did have a large influence. The failure of the referendum has to a large 
degree been credited to the Pope and the Vatican. In their urging to boycott, the referendum 
failed (DiMarco 2009:21). Manna and Nardo (2005:532) claim that the call for boycott by 
Catholic Church leaders, high ranking politicians, and Pope Benedict XVI is thought to have 
affected the vote. Critics will point out that no referendum has achieved 50 percent voter 
turnout as required, since 1995 (Reproductive Health Matters 2005:184). Despite the low 
voter turnout on referendums in general, it can still be argued that this was a victory for the 
Vatican, as they claimed. First of all, the law on assisted reproduction was a law that many 
were took interest in. Although some of the issues were difficult for most people to 
understand (Manna and Nardo 2005:532). Secondly, the voter turnout was not even close to 
the required minimum. It was barely half of that. 
 
We can see here how the Catholic Church used a different strategy with regards to the 2005 
referendum on assisted reproduction, compared to the 1974 referendum on divorce, and the 
1981 referendum to restrict the law on abortion. The context was also different, because the 
Catholic Church did not want the referendum in 2005. The Catholic Church was in favor of 
the law on assisted reproduction and did not want to repeal it. This differs from the 
aforementioned referenda in 1974 and 1981. Instead of encouraging people to vote “yes” or 
“no” on the ballot box, the Catholic Church encouraged people to not vote at all. With only 26 
percent voter turnout of the required 50 percent, the referendum failed. I have argued that this 
strategy proved a success for the Catholic Church with regards to the 2005 referendum to 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
By using a comparative method, with process tracing, and longitudinal comparisons, I have 
studied the strategies pursued by the Catholic Church to influence Italian politics. Theories on 
how the Catholic Church influences politics has been presented. In addition, theories on how 
the Catholic Church, and to some extent religious groups in general, can influence political 
parties, organizations, and referendums, has also been presented. This thesis has included a 
historical perspective. Comparisons has been made between the period after the Fall of the 
First Republic, and the period from Italy’s unification and leading up to the fall of the First 
Republic. However, the emphasis of this thesis has been on the time after the fall of the First 
Republic in 1992. The research question presented has been: 
 
How has the Catholic Church pursued various strategies to influence Italian politics, with an 
emphasis on the period after the fall of the First republic? 
 
In 1874 the Vatican decreed the Non Expedit, prohibiting Catholics from participating in 
Italian politics. The Non Expedit officially ceased to apply in 1919. With the approval of the 
Vatican, the Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) contested in its first election in 1919. The 
Catholic Church influenced politics through the PPI until 1922. In 1922, Benito Mussolini 
seized power. The Catholic Church negotiated with Mussolini and the Fascist regime, and the 
result was the Lateran Treaty of 1929. This goal was obtained by using direct influence 
through institutional participation in corporatist negotiations. In the post war era, the Catholic 
Church mainly influenced Italian politics through the Christian democratic party, Democrazia 
Cristiana (DC). The DC was very influential in Italian politics, and enjoyed a supremacy for 
more than forty-five years. After the Tangentopoli scandal, a new electoral system was 
implemented. It was no longer possible for the Catholic Church to influence Italian politics 
through a political party as it had done through the DC in the post war era. Thus, the Catholic 
Church needed to pursue other strategies to influence Italian politics. 
 
Results of my findings indicate that the Catholic Church is less active through political parties 
today compared to the post-war era, but exert a more indirect influence. Here, indirect 
influence means that the Catholic Church affects the laity and individuals more than acquiring 
state positions through the political sphere. Instead of one big Christian democratic party, as 
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the DC was in the post-war era, Catholic politicians are now spread across all parties. This 
happened partially because it became more difficult to establish a new Christian democratic 
party that could become as powerful as the DC. But mostly it can be attributed a new strategy 
of the Catholic Church. 
 
Further on, I found that the Catholic Church exerted much influence through Catholic 
organizations and movements. Mainly through the CL and the CEI. The CL influenced 
politics both through the CCD, and through lobbying activities with political parties. The CL 
is deeply rooted at the local level, but in addition to this it has connections to public figures 
and high-level politicians. Former leader of the CEI, bishop Camillo Ruini, has played a 
major role in both developing strategies for the Catholic Church, and influencing politics. An 
example of the influence of Ruini is how the Vatican chose to promote and endorse 
Berlusconi instead of Prodi as the Prime Minister of Italy. In addition to the CL and CEI, 
there are numerous Catholic, or Catholic-inspired, associations which act as interest groups in 
the political arena. 
 
It is clear that the Catholic Church has used a different strategy when it attempts to influence 
the outcome of a popular referendum. That is, a different strategy after the fall of the First 
Republic, compared to the post-war era. Although bishops, and to some extent the Popes, 
encouraged voters to cast a vote to the laws on divorce and abortion, they did so to a much 
larger degree in the case of the 2005 popular referendum on assisted reproduction. In addition, 
the Catholic Church encouraged voters to refrain from voting in 2005. This would not be 
possible in regard to the popular referendums in 1974 to repeal the law on divorce, or in 1981 
to restrict the law on abortion. In 2005, it was possible because the Catholic Church did not 
want the referendum to pass, and thus it was not necessary for the referendum to get enough 
votes. The Catholic Church could, however, have used this tactic in the 1981 vote to liberalize 
the law on abortion, which was the referendum promoted by the Radical Party (PR). 
However, it did not do this. At the time of the 2005 referendum, it was the Catholic Church 
who was the biggest advocate in encouraging people to abstain from voting. Both the bishops, 
priests, and Pope Benedict XVI were active in encouraging people not to vote. In 1974 and 
1981, the DC were campaigning to repeal the laws. 
 
Given the uniqueness of Italy as an empirical case, it can be difficult to use this research to 
generalize. The empirical results of this research are only valid in Italy, and cannot be 
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generalized. Yet, this research can be used to try to understand the strategies used by religious 
communities, interest groups, and organizations, to affect politics in different countries, 
although it is limited how much it can be used to generalize in this respect as well. Although 
the empirical results cannot be generalized, it is possible that the various strategies which the 
Catholic Church has pursued to influence Italian politics may be generalized to other 
countries with a Catholic majority. 
 
6.1 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
Further research on the field of study will always be useful. Although I have tried to give an 
answer to how the Catholic Church has pursued various strategies to influence Italian politics, 
with an emphasis on the period after the fall of the First Republic, other aspects would be 
interesting to research. Both methods to give more insight to the research question, and other 
types of research. 
 
In this thesis, I have used qualitative document analysis. It would be interesting to do semi-
structured interviews as supplementary data collection. The semi-structured interviews would 
in that case be conducted on professors, politicians, and people of influence within the 
Catholic Church. Professors such as Renato Moro of the Roma Tre University, or professors 
at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan. The latter has notable alumni such as 
Amintore Fanfani and Romano Prodi. These are only a few of those graduated from the 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan, who has had great political careers. Interviews 
with both politicians, and people of influence within the Catholic Church, could provide 
insights which existing research does not provide. 
 
Strategies evolve all the time. In this research, I have attempted to map out the most important 
strategies which have been used after the fall of the First Republic. It would be interesting to 
see the role of the CEI after Ruini left the presidency. Does the CEI still exert as much 
influence on Italian politics after 2007? 
 
An attempt to generalize this research would be interesting. As it would be to compare the 
strategies which the Catholic Church pursues to influence politics in Italy, to the strategies of 
religious groups in other countries. 
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Lastly, it would be interesting to go more in depth on each strategy. Research on how the 
Catholic Church influences Italian politics through lobbyism could serve as a master’s thesis 
on its own. Given that the objective of this research was to find out the strategies used all 
together, and that this is my contribution to the field of study, it is limited how much in depth 
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